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The proposition that a for-profit company can exist to benefit the public has
been debated for decades.1 Online retailer Etsy famously embraced an ethos of
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social responsibility until the pressures of being a publicly traded company
proved too much.2 Thousands of other companies, however, go beyond
embracing this ethos and explicitly organize themselves to promote a public
benefit.3 As these companies navigate market pressures and try to balance profit
with purpose, they will be sure to retain lawyers. The question of what is
ethically required of lawyers representing companies organized to create a
public benefit has not confronted the bar for decades.
Rules of professional responsibility are informed by substantive laws
governing clients—in the case of corporate clients, by corporate law. Corporate
law gives attorneys an ethical framework when representing corporations and
helps to interpret obligations in specific situations. If corporate law is focused
on elevating shareholder interests above all else, current ethical norms flow from
that understanding. And, if benefit corporations change that notion of
shareholder primacy, challenges to attorneys’ ethical duties should follow.
The benefit corporation is a relatively new corporate form that allows
companies to opt into a legal framework in which they can pursue a public
benefit alongside profit without running afoul of corporate law.4 Benefit
corporations were created to appeal to founders who want to grow their
businesses without losing their companies’ sense of mission and investors who
seek out investments that will return some social, in addition to financial, return.5
Benefit corporations exist somewhere between the traditional for-profit and
charitable sectors. The form seeks to create an option that combines the missiondriven work typical of the charitable space and the flexibility and market-driven
solutions of for-profit businesses. Attorneys for for-profit corporations and
nonprofit organizations operate under norms that developed in the shadow of the
law governing their clients’ organizations. If benefit corporations represent a
hybrid of for-profit and nonprofit entities, legal ethics will need to embrace a
hybrid framework as well. The benefit corporation, therefore, poses a question
that has not been asked by corporate lawyers in a long time—what does it mean
to represent a for-profit entity that exists to promote the public interest?
Lawyers for benefit corporations should integrate the spirit and purpose of the
law into their ethical obligations, much as lawyers for other types of

2. David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman.html.
3. Ellen Berrey, How Many Benefit Corporations Are There?, SSRN (May 5, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602781 (finding 2,541 benefit corporations
ever formed as of 2015); see also J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L.
REV. 541, 588–89 (2016) (noting 2,636 entities organized as benefit corporations or benefit LLCs
as of 2016); see generally Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days
Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 259–75 (2014) (describing Delaware
companies incorporating or converting to benefit corporations).
4. Berrey, supra note 3.
5. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 231, 263
(2013).
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organizations already do.6 To do so in the context of benefit corporation
legislation enables clients to serve the purpose for which their form was enacted
and comports with our understanding of corporate law and transactional attorney
ethics in light of this new corporate form. In developing a framework for
attorneys representing benefit corporations, prior rules and norms around
corporate representation and frameworks for nonprofit and government lawyers
are particularly instructive. These attorneys should balance confidentiality
obligations against their client’s legal purpose. Further, lawyers for benefit
corporations should advise their client first on the effect of their actions on the
rights of third parties, rather than how to mitigate legal risk.
Of particular concern to attorneys should be benefit corporation clients which
fail to create, or even endeavor to create, a public benefit. Companies that
deceptively hold themselves out as being mission-driven are said to engage in
greenwashing.7 Greenwashers profit off the promise to conduct business in a
way that benefits the environment, create good jobs in struggling neighborhoods,
or redirect a portion of profits or goods or services to those unable to afford
them, without actually doing so.8 The benefit corporation form may be attractive
to would-be greenwashers. By incorporating as a benefit corporation, nefarious
businesses can pursue investors, customers, and general goodwill by falsely
purporting to pursue a mission. Other benefit corporations may simply fail to
operate in a way that benefits nonshareholder stakeholders or to consider the
breadth of the effects of corporate action. Either of these situations may violate
benefit corporation legislation and lead to difficult questions for attorneys. What
are the attorney’s obligations when she has a greenwashing client? How broadly
does the attorney define her client? What is the scope of advice that the attorney
should give?
The profession is sure to face these questions. Businesses are increasingly
opting into this form.9 Household names like Patagonia10 and Kickstarter11 are
benefit corporations, and the largest benefit corporation to go public held its
initial public offering in February 2017.12 Concerningly, however, at least one
6. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of
the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1471 (2006).
7. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public
Benefit Corporations, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 525, 528 (2017).
8. See id. at 558.
9. Murray, supra note 3, at 588–89 (finding 2,636 entities organized as benefit corporations
or benefit LLCs as of 2016); Plerhoples, supra note 3, at 259–75 (analyzing Delaware benefit
corporations); Berrey, supra note 3 (finding 2,541 benefit corporations as of 2015).
10. B-Lab & Patagonia – the first California Certified B Corporation, PATAGONIA,
http://www.patagonia.com/b-lab.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
11. Yancey Stricker et al., Kickstarter is now a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER (Sept. 21,
2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-a-benefit-corporation.
12. Lauren Gensler, The World’s Biggest For-Profit College Company, Laureate Education,
Raises $490 Million In Public Debut, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:29 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2017/02/01/laureate-education-initial-public-offering/.
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benefit corporation has come under fire for promising, but ultimately failing to
balance the interests of its shareholders and other stakeholders. Rasmussen
College, a Delaware public benefit corporation, was the subject of a 2014 report
by the U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee finding
that it, along with others, failed to provide effective, affordable education to its
students despite committing to do so in its corporate charter.13
This Article explores the professional and ethical responsibilities of lawyers
representing benefit corporations, which have not previously been analyzed.
The benefit corporation as proposed or enacted across a number of states is
accepted and the Article looks at how attorneys can meet these responsibilities.
Part I examines in detail the connection between corporate law theory and
legal ethics. The rules of professional responsibility do not stand alone and are
not comprehensive enough to guide attorneys through every imaginable
situation; rather, they are dependent on and derive in part from other areas of
substantive law. In order to ethically represent an organizational client, the
attorney must show fidelity to that client’s organizational structure—its
decision-making rules, its fiduciary duties, and its property norms.14 Attorneys
must look to synthesize rules of professional conduct, corporate fiduciary law,
and the potential of civil liability for malpractice.15 The changes found in the
benefit corporation legislation require a new ethical framework for attorneys
representing these organizations. In describing that framework, I draw from
ethical rules for attorneys representing charities, government lawyering, and
prior eras of legal ethics.
Part II looks at several specific ethical rules and situations to demonstrate the
extent to which ethical obligations reflect corporate law as private law generally
and shareholder primacy specifically. Who is the client? To whom does client
confidentiality extend? What reporting duties does the attorney have in the event
of a breach of fiduciary duty? What is the scope of advice that lawyers are
required to give clients? Might an attorney be liable if her corporate client
engages in greenwashing?
Part III describes benefit corporation legislation. To understand how benefit
corporations affect attorneys’ ethical duties, it is important to understand which
features of traditional corporations they sought to change. Benefit corporations
were created as a response to both shareholder primacy specifically and private
law generally. In previous decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR),16

13. Plerhoples, supra note 7, at 560–62.
14. William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 494
(2016).
15. George Rutherglen, Lawyer for the Organization: An Essay on Legal Ethics, 1 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 141, 151–55 (2006).
16. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1351–53 (2011).
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progressive corporate law,17 and social enterprise movements18 emerged that
attempted to move corporate law, or at least corporate management practices,
toward recognition of the effects of corporate behavior on society at large.
Social enterprise boosters believed that traditional corporate forms were not
suited to the task of social enterprise and that new corporate forms were required
to accommodate purpose and profit.19 The benefit corporation arose out of this
movement. This section examines advocacy and legislative history around the
adoption of benefit corporation legislation and finds a narrow focus on
shareholder interests as a key complaint of the form’s boosters.
Part IV reassesses ethical issues in light of benefit corporation legislation to
show how, based on current understanding, attorneys’ ethical obligations will
differ when representing benefit corporations. This section focuses particularly
on attorney reporting duties in the case of clients engaged in greenwashing.
Benefit corporation legislation necessitates a return to an ethical paradigm
similar to that of the eighteenth-century public citizen. Also drawn upon is the
law governing government lawyers, who as a general rule are to represent the
public interest.20
Finally, Part V recommends specific changes, including reporting duties for
attorneys who become aware that their clients are engaging in behavior that fails
to promote a public benefit, where rules can be brought in line with the
framework described. These changes would not only clarify lawyers’ ethical
duties to these clients and the public they seek to benefit; they would also
deputize attorneys in the effort to create a public good through these entities and
guard against greenwashing.21 Also addressed are concerns that a modified view
of legal ethics would dissuade entrepreneurs from forming benefit corporations
out of fear of being reported by their attorney.
17. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW xiii–xv (1995).
18. See Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1353 (“‘Social enterprise’ is a loose term for
businesses that aim to generate profits while advancing social goals.”); see also Patience A.
Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective Impact
Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 631 (2016) (“[S]ocial enterprises are businesses that make profits
both for the benefit of the owners’ compensation as well as the advancement of a specific social
purpose or mission.”); Plerhoples, supra note 5, at 225 (citations omitted) (“According to Social
Enterprise Alliance, Inc., a non-profit organization that promotes the goals of social enterprise, a
social enterprise must ‘directly address an intractable social need and serve[ ] the common good,
either through its products and services or through the number of disadvantaged people it employs.’
For others, social enterprise means ‘blended enterprise’ or double or triple bottom line businesses—
i.e., ‘entit[ies] that intend[ ] to pursue profits and social good both in tandem and by making
considered choices to pursue one over the other.’”).
19. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1353.
20. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 794–96 (2000).
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act was similarly passed to respond to a wave of large corporate scandals
around the turn of the twenty-first century, the most prominent of which was the Enron scandal.
Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 725, 727–28 (2004).
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SUBSTANTIVE LAW GOVERNING CLIENT ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LAWYERS ETHICAL DUTIES

In the case of organizational representation, the law governing client
organizations affects lawyers’ ethical obligations when representing those
organizations. The rules of professional responsibility do not stand alone and
are not comprehensive enough to guide attorneys through every imaginable
situation; rather, they are dependent on and derive in part from other areas of
substantive law.22 Ethical duties arise from rules of professional conduct
adopted by jurisdictions23 and bar opinions interpreting those rules,24 other
regulations that apply to attorneys practicing before various regulatory
agencies,25 as well as the law of attorney malpractice.26 As a result, ethical
obligations may vary depending on the identity of a client organization.
Lawyers for traditional for-profit corporations and nonprofit organizations, for
example, should approach lawyering differently, taking into account rules
governing the client organization’s structure and purpose.
22. When interpreting specific rules of professional conduct, “[t]he law governing the
organization largely determines the ethical obligations of the attorney who represents the
organization.” Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 154.
23. I will mostly discuss the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which were
drafted by the American Bar Association and served as a model for rules of professional conduct
in thirty-seven states. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Comments, ABA (June 15, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/adoption_mrpc_comments.authcheckdam.pdf. Of course, language
and interpretations of rules of professional conduct vary by state and those changes may very well
have an impact on the questions posed in this section for attorneys representing traditional
corporations and for those advising benefit corporations. See id.
24. See,
e.g.,
Ethics
Opinions,
ABA
(Nov.
27,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ethics_opinions/.
25. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning of the
Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395, 395, 398 (1993).
26. Written rules of professional conduct and malpractice claims are related, but the two do
not overlap completely. The Model Rules state that:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached . . . .
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability . . . . Nevertheless, since the Rules
do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be
evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). It is, therefore,
possible that conduct that violates rules of professional conduct does not rise to the level of
malpractice. Likewise, attorneys could be liable for criminal or tortious behavior under theories
not based on a violation of the rules of professional conduct. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 25, at
399–400; see also Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 149 (“Model Rule 1.13(a) thus does not tell a
corporate lawyer who is authorized to act on behalf of a corporation or what the extent of his
authority is. By the same token, the law governing the organization does not directly address the
obligations of its attorney, leaving those issues to be addressed by the Model Rules or perhaps the
law of malpractice. The cross-references between each of these sources of law leave both of them
with a troubling indeterminacy. Neither one appears to be the fixed point from which the other’s
content can be filled out.”).
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Deciphering professional responsibility obligations when representing an
organization requires first that the attorney identify her client. In the case of
organizational representation, the client is the organization itself.27 Model Rule
1.13(a) provides that “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”28
Defining the client as the organization is ultimately a fiction, however, as the
attorney will necessarily interface with and take direction from individuals
within the corporation.29 For that reason, the Model Rules recognize that
attorneys represent organizations through their “duly authorized constituents.”30
The rules lack guidance on identifying an organization’s “duly authorized
constituents”; since substantive law dictates who is authorized to act on behalf
of an organization, it is necessary to look to substantive law to understand who
those “duly authorized constituents” are.31
Defining the constituents through which a client may act is key for any lawyer
representing an organization. One author wrote:
To responsibly represent a client, a lawyer needs the ability to answer
three questions: Who speaks for the client, and can thus instruct the
lawyer? Who listens for the client, and thus should receive the
information the lawyer is obliged to communicate? Who acts for the
client, and can thus take the actions needed to make commitments on
behalf of the client?32
Once she has answered those questions, the lawyer can begin to understand
what standard of care she owes and to whom, as well as available courses of
action when the attorney knows or believes that management is engaging in
improper behavior.33
27. See Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 155 (“[E]veryone knows that Model Rule 1.13(a)
requires corporate counsel to represent the organization, not the individuals within it; yet no one
knows precisely what that requires corporate counsel to do.”).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). “As applied
specifically to Model Rule 1.13(a), no purely moral principle requires a lawyer for an organization
always to act as instructed by ‘its duly authorized constituents.’ Ethics in this sense requires
lawyers to look beyond the law governing the organization and beyond legal ethics itself.” See
Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 145.
29. Ralph Jonas, Who is the Client: The Corporate Lawyer’s Dilemma., 39 HASTINGS L.J.
617, 617 (1988).
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
31. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 153–54 (“[Rules] governing representation of an
organization, dependent as they are on the interrelated fiduciary obligations of directors, officers,
and agents, are more complicated than most ethical rules. Instead of denying the judgment
necessary to take account of such complexity, it would be better to use it to frame the analysis of
the attorney’s obligations.”); see also Simon, supra note 14, at 493. As written, Model Rule 1.13
applies in all cases of organizational representation. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 148.
32. Simon, supra note 14, at 492.
33. “In order to act ethically, the lawyer must instead determine what the interests of the
organization and its constituents legitimately are and how they legitimately may be pursued.”
Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 148.
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The attorney must also understand her client organization’s legal purpose; if
a client constituent acts contrary to the organization’s legal purpose, that person
ceases to be a duly authorized constituent of the organization.34 William Simon
has coined the term “Framework of Dealing” to describe this understanding of
client identity.35 Under the “Framework of Dealing,” the lawyer owes an
obligation to the legal framework in which her client corporation operates,
including the organization’s legal purpose.36 Lawyers also have certain ethical
obligations when a client constituent is acting contrary to that legal purpose.37
Attorneys’ duties are further constrained by common law rules of malpractice.
Attorneys who fail to satisfy their obligations may find themselves liable to both
their clients and to third parties.38 The standards under which attorneys may be
held liable for malpractice depend on ethical rules39 as well as statutes.40
Changes in substantive law that affect the duties of client constituents will
inevitably require attorneys to take those changes into account and adequately
advise their clients. Lawyers must stay apprised of legal developments around,
for example, corporate officers’ duties in order to provide competent counsel.
Attorneys must, therefore, look to synthesize rules of professional conduct,
substantive law, and the potential of civil liability for malpractice.41 This may
not be an easy task. The legal structure, governing law, and the matter at hand
may all determine who constitutes the client corporation’s “duly authorized
constituents.” Key to this analysis is an understanding of the client’s legal
purpose. The following sections discuss the legal purposes of corporations,
nonprofit organizations, and government agencies. They also describe the ways
in which these legal purposes affect lawyers’ professional responsibility
obligations. Understanding the ways in which benefit corporation legislation
departs from or is similar to legal purposes in other settings will help interpret
how to lawyer to the benefit corporation. This Section examines the connection
between substantive law and legal ethics in three contexts: lawyers representing
corporate clients, lawyers for nonprofit organizations, and government lawyers.
Section II below attempts to apply these principles to ethical rules around

34. William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An
Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 80–81 (2003).
35. Id. at 86–103.
36. Id. at 86–87.
37. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 164.
38. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 25, at 400.
39. Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice: Do
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 46 (1998)
(“[E]xamination of judicial decisions in a number of areas confirms that courts regularly cite ethical
rules to support propositions that augment or modify the civil law.”).
40. Id. at 69 (“The widely accepted test for applying statutory standards to civil actions is
whether the legislature intended to protect the class of persons of whom the plaintiff is a member
from the type of harm that occurred.”).
41. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 151–55.
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confidentiality and reporting, the scope of advice that attorneys give their clients,
and the extent to which attorneys can be held liable to third parties.
A. The Traditional Model of Corporation Representation
In the case of corporate representation, the attorney must grasp both the legal
nature of her client and the law governing her client in order to understand her
duties to that client. Corporate law’s implications on ethical duties can be broken
down into three categories:
There are decision rules that allocate presumptive responsibility and
specify procedures. There are fiduciary duties that require that
decision-making responsibility be exercised in the interests of the
organization, rather than in the individual interests of the decisionmakers. And, there are property norms that distinguish the
organization’s assets from the personal assets of the constituents and
delineate the relative claims on organizational assets by constituents.
The fiduciary norms qualify the decision rules, making authority
conditional on its exercise in the interest of the organization. The
property norms give definition to fiduciary duties, indicating which
constituent interests should be deemed interests of the organization.42
When representing a corporation, the attorney’s client is the corporation itself
and not any individual officer, director, employee, or shareholder constituent.43
The attorney does not consider merely the group of decision-makers as her client
but refers to the rules around the authority structure and purpose of the
corporation to interpret her ethical obligations. Decision, fiduciary, and property
rules and duties constitute corporate purpose, and a violation of any also
constitutes a violation of corporate purpose. Following the dictates of corporate
law, the attorney must act in a way that is reasonable with respect to other
corporate constituents’ interests, including those of shareholders, rather than
simply deferring to the direction of management.44
This generally accepted model of corporate representation reflects an
understanding of corporate law as a private ordering mechanism that serves to
protect the interests of shareholders above all else, but the legal purpose of the
corporation is and has been the subject of great deliberation.45 Much of the
debate over the proper role of corporate law is a debate over who has a legal
right to call herself a constituent or a stakeholder of the corporation.46 This
contrast is between the view that “corporate activity has broad social and
political ramifications that justify a body of corporate law that is deliberately
42.
43.
44.
45.

Simon, supra note 14, at 493.
Jonas, supra note 29, at 617.
Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 148.
Martin Lipton et al., The Purpose of the Corporation, HARV. L. S CH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/11/thepurpose-of-the-corporation/.
46. See Ved P. Nanda et al., 1 TRANSACTIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1.7 (2018).
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responsive to public interest concerns” and the view that corporate law governs
“little more than the private relations between the shareholders of the
corporation and management, which acts as their agents or trustees.”47 On one
end of the spectrum, the corporation’s owners are its only true constituents and
it is their interest and no one else’s that dictates the corporation’s goals.48 On
the other, the corporation’s stakeholders extend to a broad constituency, up to
and including the public at large.49
Ascertaining who falls within the corporation’s constituency determines to
whom a corporate constituent owes a duty. The next step is to ask what duty,
exactly, is owed. In the narrowest formulation of corporate duties, officers and
directors owe a duty to the shareholders alone.50 Those duties are generally
defined as fiduciary duties—namely, the duties of care and loyalty—which are
enforceable by shareholders.51 If the corporation owes a duty to a wider group
of constituents than merely its shareholders, the definition of that duty gets
muddled. The corporation is capable of creating financial benefits beyond profit
to shareholders, such as jobs or savings for consumers, and is even able to drive
non-financial outcomes, like environmental effects. Of course, the corporation
is capable of doing harm as well. Does this mean that corporate directors and
officers owe duties to, for example, employees and customers?
This debate could also be described as a contrast between a view of
corporations as private property and a conception of corporations as public
social institutions.52 Under the property conception, the corporation is solely the
property of its shareholders, and to spend that property on something other than

47. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201–02 (1990) (calling
this dichotomy “abidingly crucial”).
48. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23,
26 (1991).
49. See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); see Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (finding that the court will not question the
business judgment of directors who must consider the public and shareholders in determining the
long-term interests of a corporation); Linda Kawaguchi, Introduction to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.:
Primary Source and Commentary Material, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 493, 493–96 (2014) (discussing
Dodge through an analysis of the court transcripts).
50. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. This is often, though not always, defined as maximizing
profit to shareholders. Plerhoples, supra note 7, at 535 (“Delaware courts espouse the shareholder
wealth maximization norm as the central purpose of a corporation.”); William H. Clark, Jr. &
Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business
Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825 (2012) (“[A] business corporation has as its
purpose creating financial gain for its shareholders . . . .”).
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); Annotation,
In General, West’s ALR Digest Corporations and Business Organizations k1841 (2018).
52. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992).
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shareholder benefit is morally and normatively wrong.53 It follows that the
creation of wealth should always be the corporation’s objective and that
corporate law should not pay attention to who benefits from corporate action
aside from shareholders.54 This property concept is private ordering in its
narrowest form: corporate law exists to regulate the relationship between the
corporation and its shareholders. Under the social institution conception, on the
other hand, the corporation must strive to satisfy consumers, provide
employment, and contribute to “public life of its communities.”55
Management’s job, therefore, is to balance these competing interests.56 This
view hints at a public ordering regime: management discretion is necessary to
monitor the corporation’s effect on the public and other stakeholders and
mitigate negative outcomes as they see fit.57
The public versus private nature of corporate law is vital under the
“Framework of Dealing.” The more constrained the corporate duties are, the
more the attorney’s obligations are themselves circumscribed. Corporate law
has, by and large, embraced shareholder primacy, thereby requiring that
directors prioritize the interests of shareholders above all else.58 Corporate law
gives those directors wide latitude when deciding how to do so.59 Attorneys are
also to give their clients latitude, mostly deferring to the wishes of corporate
fiduciaries absent evidence of clear harm to the shareholders. Fiduciary laws,
however, do place limitations on management’s ability to act on the legal
positions that attorneys can take.60 Though attorneys do not take instruction
from shareholders, and although attorneys are not in an attorney-client
relationship with shareholders, “[t]he attorney must act reasonably to protect the
interests of shareholders or other constituents of the organization to whom
management owes fiduciary obligations.”61
We can imagine two public corporations, both incorporated in states that
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which demonstrate these
53. Id. at 267–69.
54. Id. at 264–65. Allen does concede that, in the property conception, a government may
have a role to play in addressing issues of wealth distribution and external social cost through
taxation and regulation, although such powers should apparently be applied ex-post rather than exante to any corporate action. Id. at 269–70.
55. Id. at 271.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 272. Proponents of both views argue that their view is not ultimately about public
versus private benefit but rather two views of how to best maximize value to the shareholders and
over what timeline; the property view correctly focuses on taking advantage of short-term
opportunities, while the entity view ensures that shareholders can extract profit from an enterprise
over a longer amount of time. Id.
58. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998).
59. Charles Hanson, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355, 1356 (1993).
60. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 151–55.
61. Id. at 153.
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frameworks. Red Corp. is a traditional corporation that operates under a
shareholder primacy regime. Green Corp. is a corporation that has opted out of
this regime and explicitly exists to create a general public benefit and with a
stated specific public purpose of “conducting operations in a manner causing no
unnecessary harm by continually seeking to reduce the environmental footprint”
while creating jobs in local, underserved communities.62 It has designated both
a specific director and officer to oversee the creation and reporting of those
benefits. Both produce widgets and have similar customer, vendor, and
employee bases.
The framework under which attorneys for Red Corp. operate is well
understood. Attorneys for corporations are zealous advocates63 for the
corporation’s interests, which is defined largely (though not entirely) by the
interests of its shareholders. The attorney’s duties are explicitly grounded in
corporate law as private ordering. “[C]orporations . . . are only formal
arrangements of real persons pursuing their real interests” and are therefore
deserving of exercising their autonomy as much as individuals who “pursued
their interests in simple arrangements and associations[.]”64 The corporate
client’s interest in exercising autonomy as a group of persons, therefore, trumps
any larger societal obligation the corporate may have, and lawyers do “justice”
by furthering that exercise of autonomy.
The upshot of corporate law for lawyers is the duty to guard against risk that
could harm the corporation (and therefore harm the value of the shareholders’
investment).65 Among a lawyer’s most important and valuable roles,
particularly in a transactional context, is identifying and counseling clients on
legal risk. Legal risk refers to the risk of legal liability and is distinct from
reputational, relational, or other business risk to the client; though lawyers often
advise clients on these matters as well.66 Few lawyers view their obligations as
62. This language is modeled in part on the language of Patagonia, a California private benefit
corporation. This is part of Patagonia’s specific public benefit. Annual Benefit Corporation
Report,
PATAGONIA
WORKS
8
(2016),
http://www.societabenefit.net/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Patagonia-2016.pdf.
63. Lawyers need to be zealous advocates for their clients while also seeking to advise and
understand their clients. William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty
of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004).
64. Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1076 (1976). Fried acknowledged that the analysis of who the
client is, what that client’s interests are, to whom the lawyer owes loyalty, and the substance of that
loyalty in the case of a corporate client are complex questions deserving of “complicated though
wholly coherent” analysis. Id.
65. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
(requiring a lawyer to report up the chain of command and giving them discretion to report outside
the corporation any actions which are “likely to result in substantial injury to the organization”).
66. See generally Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory
State: Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001,
2002 (2016) (providing a discussion of how attorneys evaluate and advise clients on business risk
related to international human rights issues).

2019]

Who is the Client?

303

extending to protecting against harm to non-shareholder third parties absent the
identification of some legal or business risk to the client corporation. Indeed,
many corporate lawyers believe that the law requires only compliance with the
literal letter of the law and that attorneys, therefore, should advise their clients
on meeting the law’s minimum standards only.67 The view is not constrained
by the public interest if the public interest is not explicitly stated in the law.68
This articulation of client identity reflects what I have previously defined as
the Unary and Multiary Models.69 “In the Unary Model, both corporate
fiduciaries and attorneys work for a singular purpose.”70 Corporate fiduciaries’
“sole concern is that of the corporation’s shareholders, and the lawyer’s sole
concern is that of her client.”71 The opposite of the Unary Model is the Multiary
Model, in which “corporate fiduciaries must concern themselves with a wide
range of stakeholders . . .” and the attorney owes duties beyond those that she
owes her client.72 So, while Red Corp.’s attorneys guard against legal and other
risk, Green Corp.’s attorneys’ duties are broader and more amorphous.
Corporate law is key to understanding both attorneys’ obligations. In the case
of conflict among members of Red Corp.’s control group, for example, the
lawyer is to follow the rules governing the relative authority of constituents to
know to whom she should defer.73 And, should the highest authority within the
client corporation insist on acting in a way that is counter to the purpose of the
corporation—the promotion of shareholder interests—the attorney should resign
the representation.74 The shareholders themselves may fall within the
corporation’s “duly authorized constituents”75 if the client’s governing
documents or governing law require that the shareholders approve a particular
matter, particularly in closely held corporations. Corporate law, the client
corporation’s governing documents, and the nature of the client corporation all
determine a corporation’s attorney’s course of action.

67. Simon, supra note 6, at 1455–57.
68. See also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 626 (1986).
The client’s autonomy should be limited by the law, not by the lawyer’s morality. And if
“the law” is manipulable and without clear limits on client conduct, that aspect of the law
should be available to the client. If moral limits are not provided by the law and are not
imposed by the lawyer, their source will be where it ought to be: the client.
Id.
69. See Joseph Pileri, Uncharted Waters? Legal Ethics and the Benefit Corporation, 8 ST.
MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 180, 183–86 (2017).
70. Id. at 183.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 186.
73. See Simon, supra note 34, at 75–77.
74. Id. at 80.
75. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Problem of Client Identity in the Context of
Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV. 181, 211–12 (2004).
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In the case of both Green Corp. and Red Corp., the lawyer will define the
client as the organization. Though the identity of the client will not differ
between the two, corporate law will affect who speaks for each corporation and
set the bounds of the attorney’s role. This leads to certain obligations that arise
in the event that the client is ignoring or subverting its chosen purpose. The
outcome of the obligation to protect these constituents’ interests is explored in
several specific situations below.
B. Nonprofit Lawyers
Attorneys have a unique set of obligations when representing nonprofit and
charitable organizations. Rather than promoting the interests of shareholders,
nonprofit charities exist to further a charitable purpose.76 Nonprofit directors
owe a duty of obedience to carry out the organization’s stated mission.77 Unlike
corporations, nonprofit organizations are not accountable to their beneficiaries;
the state rather than the beneficiaries plays the central role in ensuring that these
organizations are complying with their stated purpose.78 The duty of obedience
exists to supplement the duties of care and loyalty and to hold charitable
directors to their organizational purpose.79
The duty of obedience informs the nonprofit attorney’s obligations much in
the way fiduciary duties inform the corporate attorney’s work. The nonprofit
attorney must take the mission of her client as defined by the organization’s
governing documents into account when defining her duties.80 The attorney’s
commitment to their nonprofit clients requires that she work on behalf of that
mission.81 She must also be mindful that the nonprofit organization has no
owners and that its beneficiaries have no direct role in monitoring the
organization’s activities. Because this role is delegated to the state and federal
governments, the nonprofit attorney must advise her client in the context of those
regulatory schemes.82 The government defines how the organization may
further its purpose and the risk for failing to do so, both of which factor into the
attorney’s obligations.

76. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016).
77. David S. Walker, A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(C)(3) Nonprofit Organization, 38
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 660 (2012). But see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 305 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018) (allowing directors to
amend governing documents and mission statement from time to time).
78. Simon, supra note 34, at 112–13.
79. Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: SarbanesOxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1985 (2007).
80. Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV .
267, 334–35 (2017); Walker, supra note 77, at 660.
81. Walker, supra note 77, at 660.
82. See Simon, supra note 34, at 112–13.
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C. Government Lawyers
Lawyers for the government similarly draw from the legal framework in
which their clients operate. Government lawyers not only have clients who
serve the public interest, but these attorneys are to represent the public interest
themselves.83 The role that government attorneys play has often been described
as that of “gatekeeper”: attorneys use their position “to halt malfeasance by
decisionmakers and prevent harm to . . . third parties”84 and promote the public
interest.85 As gatekeepers, government lawyers should recognize that they have
a higher obligation than their colleagues to represent the public interest.86
Government attorneys, therefore, balance their obligations to their clients
against this mandate to not cause harm to the public.
Defining the client’s identity is a difficult task for the government lawyer.
The government lawyer is usually employed by and reports to individuals within
executive agencies, who are under the ultimate control of the executive, but
tasked with executing laws passed by the legislature, all of whom are ultimately
accountable to the public. The Federal Bar Association has held that the
particular agency that employs the attorney is the proper articulation of client
identity.87 However, government lawyers are also said to represent the public
interest.88 The attorney must, therefore, keep in mind the larger structures of
government, including checks and balances among the branches and the
agency’s role within that structure.89 This requires that the government attorney
carry out her work “in a manner that is not clearly inconsistent with lawful
requirements[,]” a duty that goes above and beyond those of private attorneys.90
Government lawyers face certain obstacles when deciphering their ethical
duties—namely, that ethical rules are designed primarily for litigators in the
private bar91 and that the definition of “the public interest” is difficult to define.92
These attorneys must “identify the public interest in regard to the particular legal
problems faced by them in their work as government attorneys.”93

83. See Berenson, supra note 20, at 789.
84. Note, Government Counsel and Their Obligations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2008).
85. Id. at 1412.
86. See Berenson, supra note 20, at 794.
87. Honorable Charles Fahy, The Government Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32
FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973).
88. See Berenson, supra note 20, at 789.
89. Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV .
1033, 1056–62 (2007).
90. Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the Government Lawyer?, in ETHICAL
STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 28 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2d ed. 2008).
91. Clark, supra note 89, at 1038.
92. Berenson, supra note 20, at 814.
93. Id.
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II. INTERPRETATIONS OF SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS REFLECT LAW GOVERNING
CLIENT ORGANIZATIONS
As a result of the interplay between substantive law and legal ethics, attorneys
may have different professional responsibility obligations depending on the
identity of their client. Substantive law can aid attorneys in answering the
following questions: How strong or weak are confidentiality obligations? Are
there situations in which an attorney can or may report client activity without
violating confidentiality, and to whom? What is the scope of advice that the
attorney is required to give? Might the attorney be liable to nonclient third
parties for client activity? The following sections attempt to answer those
questions for attorneys representing corporations, nonprofit organizations, and
government agencies; later sections draw on that analysis to interpret attorneys’
obligations when representing benefit corporations.
A. Confidentiality and Reporting
Chief among any lawyer’s obligations is the duty to retain client
confidentialities.94 Model Rule 1.6 states that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by [this rule].”95 Although all
attorneys are bound by confidentiality, attorneys balance their confidentiality
obligations against the law governing their client organization. As a result,
confidentiality protections may be stronger or weaker depending on the identity
of the client.
In the organizational context, any information the attorney receives will come
from individuals; it is, therefore, important that both the attorney and the person
divulging information understand when those communications are confidential
and with whom information relayed can be shared. Those within the client’s
“circle of confidentiality” may share confidential information with the
corporation’s attorney themselves, for example, without entering into an
attorney-client relationship, and an attorney is then free to share that information
within that circle.96
Confidentiality concerns are of particular interest for attorneys who identify
constituents acting unlawfully or in a way that violates the organization’s legal
purpose. If a corporate client’s purpose is defined as furthering the interests of
its shareholders, it is necessary to ask what obligations an attorney has if she

94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
95. Id.
96. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should
Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 874–76 (1998). Over time, the circle of confidentiality has
expanded from communications made under conditions of secrecy to “anyone within the corporate
structure whose duties related to the issues upon which the attorney was asked to render legal
assistance.” Id.
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knows or believes that one of her client’s officers or directors is violating one of
their duties to the client’s shareholders. Model Rule 1.13 generally provides
procedures for an attorney who:
knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the
organization is engaged in action . . . that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably
might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization.97
The lawyer first shall refer the matter to the highest authority in the
organization “[u]nless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in
the best interest of the organization to do so[.]”98 If that authority fails to act, in
certain circumstances, the lawyer may reveal the information to a third party
even though such revelation would otherwise violate the prohibition against
disclosing confidential information.99
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),100 passed in the wake of the Enron
scandal, adds additional reporting requirements for attorneys that come under
the SEC’s jurisdiction (generally, those representing publicly traded
companies).101 SOX rules add to, rather than preempt, state ethical duties.102
SOX places two requirements on attorneys who identify certain material
violations: (1) disclosing confidential information regarding material violations
of law to persons of authority within the client corporation (reporting up); and
(2) disclosing such information outside the corporation under certain
circumstances (reporting out).103 The rules promulgated under SOX first require
that attorneys who “become[] aware of evidence of a material violation by the
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
98. Id.
Rule 1.13 . . . despite its mandatory language, contains a number of important limitations
and qualifications (or should we say loopholes) that give lawyers wide discretion, making
enforcement difficult. These include: (1) the actual knowledge standard as the trigger
for the lawyer’s duty; (2) a definitive “violation” rather than evidence of a violation or a
potential violation; (3) the requirement that the violation be “related to the
representation;” (4) the requirement that the violation “is likely to result in substantial
injury” rather than simply being “material;” (5) the requirement that the substantial injury
be “to the organization,” ignoring the situations in which only third persons are harmed
by the illegality; (6) the exception to the reporting up duty if the lawyer “reasonably
believes that it is not necessary in the best interests of the organization to do so;” and (7)
the limitation that lawyers need to report to the “highest authority” only “if warranted by
the seriousness of the matter.”
Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 739 (citations omitted).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codifed as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
101. See generally Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 727–28, 740–51 (discussing when an
attorney is “‘appearing and practicing’ before the SEC”).
102. See id. at 788–92.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
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issuer . . . report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief
executive officer.”104 Should the attorney “reasonably believe[] that the chief
legal officer . . . has [not] provided an appropriate response within a reasonable
time, the attorney shall report the evidence of a material violation to” the client’s
board’s audit committee, another appropriate committee, or the board of
directors itself.105 These constitute the attorney’s reporting up duties. The
attorney may also reveal evidence of material violations to the SEC without the
client’s permission should the attorney reasonably believe it necessary to prevent
the client from committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of the client or investors, or to rectify
the consequences of such a material violation.106 These constitute the attorney’s
optional reporting out procedures.
In order to satisfy their ethical obligations in the event of a breach of a duty to
a shareholder, attorneys must understand whether fiduciary violations fall within
the definition of activities that trigger obligations under either the Model Rules
or SOX. But, before getting to that question, the attorney must first make a
determination that there is a breach at all. Identifying a breach of fiduciary duty
is difficult. It is accepted that the attorney’s presumption of deference to
corporate management is overcome when the manager is engaging in activity
that either is illegal or threatens the corporation with serious harm.107 However,
the business judgment rule provides directors with a significant safe harbor when
making corporate decisions.108 Absent clear ethical guidelines, the lawyer’s
judgment determines whether breaches of fiduciary do or should trump
confidentiality.109
The Model Rules provide no such guidelines. Under Model Rule 1.13, the
attorney must know of a violation before she has the discretion to report.110 She
must be certain that the behavior in question is a violation of fiduciary duties
before bringing that behavior to the board or other appropriate person.111 The
attorney should feel confident that a claim based on these actions will overcome
the business judgment rule—a very difficult standard.112 This is perhaps
imaginable in a Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. situation
104. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2018).
105. Id. § 205.3(b)(3). Alternatively, the lawyer may report this evidence to a qualified legal
compliance committee should the client corporation have created such a committee. Id. § 205.3(c).
106. Id. § 205.3(d). The attorney may also report evidence of a material violation to the SEC
to prevent the client from committing perjury or other fraud. Id.
107. Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2021–29.
108. See Hanson, supra note 59, at 1356.
109. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS.
LAW. 439, 453–54 (2005).
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
111. Id.
112. See Hanson, supra note 59, at 1356.
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in which the board is preparing to reject the highest offer in a competitive bid
for the sale of the company.113 Outside of Revlon, however, instances in which
an attorney is positive that a fiduciary duty is being breached may be rare.114
Assuming that the attorney is confident that a breach of fiduciary duty is
occurring, she then must determine whether such a breach constitutes “a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization[.]”115 Courts and scholars who have
considered this question have mostly found that a breach of fiduciary duty is not
a violation of law, though this is far from settled. In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, a majority shareholder forced the buyout of minority shareholders for a
price that the minority felt was far below market value.116 Minority shareholders
brought a lawsuit against the majority shareholder alleging that a breach of
fiduciary duties to the minority violated federal securities laws.117 The Supreme
Court found that a breach of the duty of fair dealing to minority stockholders by
itself did not fall within the definition of “fraud and deceit” and rejected the
minority stockholder claim under securities laws outlawing “fraud and
deceit.”118 As applied to fiduciaries generally, most states do not permit an
attorney to disclose a breach of fiduciary duty to the beneficiary on grounds that
to do so would violate attorney-client confidentiality.119 Breaches of fiduciary
duty are therefore outside the traditional understanding of “lawlessness” that

113. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
(holding that once a company is in a competitive bidding situation and sale of the company is
inevitable, the board is obligated to accept the highest price for the shareholders). Though the
ruling in Revlon applies only in a narrow set of circumstances, it is often referenced to support the
notion that Delaware corporate law requires corporate management to favor the economic interests
of its shareholders above all other concerns. See, e.g., Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious
Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 133–34 (2016); P.M. Vasudev,
The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, and Theory: Evidence From the Field and the
Path Onward, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 419 (2012).
114. Ethan G. Stone, Business Strategists and Election Commissioners: How the Meaning of
Loyalty Varies with the Board’s Distinct Fiduciary Roles, 31 J. CORP. L. 893, 898–99 (2006) (“It
is very difficult to prove that a fiduciary acted for an improper purpose. Courts have, accordingly,
identified objective conflicts of interest that cast enough doubt on a fiduciary’s motives to establish
a ‘per se’ case for breach without any need to convince the judge of the fiduciary’s actual state of
mind.”).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
116. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 465–67 (1977).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 471–74. Some states have held that a breach of fiduciary duty is itself a form of
fraud. See, e.g., Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 487–88 (Ky. 1991).
119. See Kennedy Lee, Representing the Fiduciary: To Whom Does the Attorney Owe Duties?,
37 ACTEC L.J. 469, 489 (2011). Washington does allow attorneys to disclose information about
a breach of fiduciary duty to beneficiaries of court-appointed fiduciaries. Id. at 492.
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trigger reporting duties, and attorneys generally limit those triggers to violations
of criminal and regulatory laws.120
The general lack of inclusion of a breach of fiduciary within the triggering
activities of Model Rule 1.13 is seemingly at odds with the “Framework of
Dealing” conceptualization of client identity. Shareholder primacy says that
duties to shareholders—the corporation’s primary beneficiaries—are supremely
important under corporate law.121 If the attorney ultimately owes a duty to the
laws and norms governing her client, a violation of those duties should be of
utmost importance. The “Framework of Dealing” would, therefore, require
attorneys to interpret Model Rule 1.13 to report up any known fiduciary
violations. Is this not a potential injury to the corporation itself, which exists to
further the interests of its beneficiaries? Not including violations of fiduciary
duties among the activities that lawyers must report up would be to put the
interests of individual directors, officers, or whoever else benefits from the
volatile act over the interests of the corporation’s shareholders.122
The attorney’s obligations under SOX in the event of a fiduciary violation are
clearer. Under the regulations implementing SOX, a “material violation”
includes “a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal
or state law, or a similar material violation of any United States federal or state
law.”123 This provision was added to specifically address the perception, arising
from Santa Fe Industries, among others, that state ethical rules did not require
attorneys to report breaches of fiduciary duty.124
When representing a publicly traded company, the attorney will have to
undertake the analysis of whether behavior amounts to a breach discussed above.
However, under SOX, the attorney only needs “evidence,” rather than
knowledge, of such a breach, and once the attorney has such evidence, she is
required to report it up the corporate ladder.125 For attorneys representing public
120. Simon, supra note 6, at 1465. On the other hand, Rutherglen argues that attorneys for a
closely held corporation are required to act to protect the interests of shareholders, including
reporting breaches of fiduciary duties. See Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 163–64. Model Rule 1.6
permits attorneys to disclose information
to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result
in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of
which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services [or] to prevent, mitigate or
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services[.]
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
121. Smith, supra note 58, at 278.
122. Simon, supra note 14, at 511.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2018). “Breach of fiduciary duty refers to any breach of fiduciary
or similar duty to the issuer recognized under an applicable Federal or State statute or at common
law, including but not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and
approval of unlawful transactions.” Id. § 205.2(d).
124. Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 806 n.319.
125. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
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corporations or otherwise practicing before the SEC,126 it appears that the
attorney has no choice but to report evidence of breaches of fiduciary duty to the
chief legal officer or board of directors, though she has discretion over whether
to report such evidence to the SEC.127 These requirements reflect the
seriousness which with Congress and the SEC view violations of fiduciary duty.
Under SOX, these violations are on par with other unlawful activities and merit
that confidentiality be overridden to protect shareholders.
A final question for attorneys is whether, if the attorney may report a breach
of fiduciary duty up the corporate ladder, she may also report that breach to
shareholders. Under the Model Rules, again, it is not clear that attorneys have
any reporting obligations in the event of a breach of fiduciary duty and, even if
they do, the standard for reporting them is high and the attorneys retain
discretion to do.128 Nonetheless, should an attorney feel confident that a breach
is happening and feel obligated to report that breach, Model Rule 1.13 allows
for disclosure to shareholders in certain situations.129 In closely held
corporations, for example, shareholders are limited to a small, definable class
which retains the ability to make decisions within the company.130 Disclosure
of a breach to them, then, comports with Model Rule 1.13’s call to report to the
“highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by
applicable law.”131 In corporations where the shareholders’ ability to direct
corporate action is more limited than in a closely held corporation, disclosure
beyond the board of directors would likely be prevented by Model Rule 1.6.132
The attorney must, therefore, evaluate the breach in the context of the structure
126. See Cramton et al., supra note 26, at 740–51 (discussing when an attorney is “‘appearing
and practicing’ before the SEC”).
127. Id. at 751–52, 764, 786–87.
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
129. Id.
130. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 163–64.
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
132. Miriam P. Hechler, The Role of the Corporate Attorney within the Takeover Context:
Loyalties to Whom?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943, 959–60 (1996) .
Rule 1.13 appears to restrict attorneys from disclosing fiduciary violations to
shareholders, arguably the constituency most deserving of protection in takeover
situations. The Rule stresses that the attorney should move cautiously ‘in the best interest
of the organization,’ minimize any ‘disruption,’ and reduce the risk of revealing
information to ‘persons outside the organization. The text does not clarify whether
shareholders are considered persons ‘outside the organization.’ The Rule goes on to say,
however, that the attorney may reveal misconduct to ‘the highest authority that can act
on behalf of the organization.’ As shareholders lack the authority to act on behalf of the
corporation, this language would appear to preclude disclosure to shareholders. Thus,
under the current framework, ‘the strongest action a lawyer may take is to resign, but
resignation must be triggered by harm to the corporation, not to third parties.’ The Rule
fails to state with clarity whether shareholders are to be considered the attorney’s ‘client’
or mere third parties.
Id.
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of her client organization and decide whether confidentiality requirements trump
her ability to report potential violations of law. Given that confidentiality is not
discretionary, while reporting is, and given the difficulties in identifying when a
breach of fiduciary duty would be reportable at all, it is unlikely the rules permit,
much less require, disclosure of fiduciary violations to shareholders in most
situations other than in closely held corporations where there is unity between
management and ownership.133 SOX, on the other hand, limits its reporting
obligations and options to certain officers and directors of the client and the
SEC.134 This perhaps makes sense in the context of public companies:
shareholder disclosure would be nearly tantamount to public disclosure.135
Overwhelmingly, confidentiality protections are strict in the traditional
corporate context.
When representing a nonprofit organization, attorneys balance confidentiality
obligations against their client’s charitable mission. Though a failure to further
its mission would certainly be a violation of organizational purpose, a failure to
further the nonprofit organization’s mission is distinct from a breach of fiduciary
duty. Unlike corporate law, nonprofit organizations’ missions are policed by
state attorneys general and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rather than
owners or beneficiaries of the organization.136 Breaches of duties, the failure to
diligently pursue a charitable mission, and deviations from the nonprofit
organization’s lawful mission are all subject to enforcement actions by both the
IRS and state attorneys general.137 Corporate law, on the other hand, leaves
enforcement of corporate duties to shareholders.138 Failure to promote the
mission should fall within the traditional set of unlawful behaviors that trigger
Model Rule 1.13 responsibilities, though there is little case law and few
examples of this. Because the failure to further a charitable mission is a violation
of state and federal law, there are more onerous reporting requirements on
nonprofit and tax-exempt organizations than are required of corporations,
particularly those that are privately held.139 The New York State Attorney
General’s 2018 lawsuit against the Donald J. Trump Foundation, for example,
accused the charity of “persistent violation[s] of state and federal law,” including
“improper and extensive political activity, repeated and willful self-dealing
transactions, and failure to follow basic fiduciary obligations or to implement

133. See generally Paul J. Sigwarth, Note, It’s MY Privilege and I’ll Assert It If I Want to: The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Closely-Held Corporations, 23 J. CORP. L. 345 (1998) (discussing
closely-held corporations and attorney-client privilege).
134. See Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 141; Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 728, 740.
135. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 160.
136. Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through
a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 11, 13, 17 (2009).
137. Id. at 13, 18.
138. Id. at 37.
139. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6033 (2012); CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 12586, 12587 (Deering 2018);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 301–307, 311, 312 (2018).
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even elementary corporate formalities required by law.”140 The state’s role in
regulating charities, and the reporting requirements placed on charities, obviate
much of the concern that animates attorney reporting duties under SOX, and
attorneys are permitted to exercise their reporting authority under the Model
Rules on the grounds that violating the mission is a clear violation of law.
Government attorneys similarly balance confidentiality obligations against
furthering the public interest. The public nature of government lawyering
requires that confidentiality be limited.141 The ABA explicitly contemplated this
when drafting the Model Rules, saying in a comment: “[W]hen the client is a
governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between
maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or
rectified, for public business is involved.”142 The Model Rules contain explicit
disclosure requirements for prosecutors.143 Whistleblowing protections meant
to protect government workers from retaliatory firing after reporting unlawful
or inappropriate behavior apply to government lawyers.144 Statutes also create
reporting requirements for lawyers who identify misconduct or violations of law
within their agency.145
Government attorneys struggle separating behavior that is harmful or counter
to the public interest from activity with which they disagree. These rules
intentionally exclude matters that are not unlawful but which the lawyer
nonetheless disagrees with as a matter of policy. In order to eliminate the need
for the attorney to use her own moral or political judgment about the public
interest to guide her reporting obligations, the rules define reporting obligations
in the specific instances mentioned above rather than define what the public
interest is.146 These rules provide that the lawyer can report violations of law,
140. Petition for the Petitioner at 1, People v. Trump, 88 N.Y.S.3d 830 (N.Y. Cty. 2018) (No.
541130/2018).
141. Clark, supra note 89, at 1046–47 (discussing how Freedom of Information Act and other
federal statutes require disclosure of government documents unless there is a good reason to
prohibit the disclosure).
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
144. Robert T. Begg, Whistleblower Law and Ethics, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 224 (Patricia Salkin ed., 2d ed., 2008). But see Jessica Wang, Protecting Government
Attorney Whistleblowers: Why We Need an Exception to Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 26
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1063, 1063 (2013) (arguing that clarification is needed when it comes to the
roles and responsibilities of government attorneys who must honor the attorney-client privilege and
reveal fraudulent activity in the government to further the public interest).
145. Begg, supra note 144, at 221–22.
146. Berenson, supra note 20, at 805.
However, it is not necessary for lawyers to be able to identify such a grand, overarching
conception of the public interest in order for them to serve the public interest in their role
as government attorneys. Rather, lawyers only need to be able to identify the public
interest in regard to the particular legal problems faced by them in their work as
government attorneys.
Id. at 814.
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but the lawyer would be violating confidentiality if she were to report things that
she merely thinks are counter to the public interest.147
B. Scope of Advice
Ethical rules also govern the scope of advice that an attorney is required to
give her client.148 Attorneys generally advise their clients on “the means by
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.”149 The Model Rules say
that the lawyer must provide her client with the information the client (or the
decision-makers within the client in the case of organizational representation)
requires to act.150 An attorney’s advice must also be aimed at helping the client
fulfill its statutorily mandated objective.151
While attorneys are not in an attorney-client relationship with a client
corporation’s shareholders,152 directors’ fiduciary duties require that attorneys
advise corporate clients in such a way as to protect shareholder interests.153 For
attorneys to disregard this information would be to deprive directors of
necessary information and potentially participate in harming shareholders.
Corporate law has traditionally required that management exercise its discretion
to manage the corporation on the basis of adequate information and with
appropriate deliberation.154 The attorney, then, works to ensure that her client’s
decision-makers have adequate information (either from her or from some other
source), that the decision-makers duly deliberate, and that the aforementioned
review of information and deliberation is adequately documented.
Under the Unary Model, we would expect that attorneys be required to advise
corporate decision-makers on the effects of corporate action on shareholders, but
the effects on other constituents and stakeholders to be outside the ambit of
required legal advice. Model Rule 2.1 seems to agree, stating that “[i]n
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
147. Begg, supra note 144, at 222–23.
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
149. Id.
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also Simon, supra
note 14, at 501 (“[U]nder traditional fiduciary principles, the lawyer’s disclosure duties are defined
in terms of materiality; the fiduciary should disclose information the client needs or wants to make
decisions.”).
151. That is not to say that the attorney must ensure that the client meets that objective. Model
Rule 1.16 provides that the attorney is to resign the representation if “the representation will result
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law[.]” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.16(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
152. Hechler, supra note 132, at 958 (“[A]n attorney representing a fiduciary owes a duty of
responsibility to his client only, and not to the fiduciary’s intended beneficiary.”).
153. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 153. “The fiduciary obligations of managers impose
constraints on the legal position that the attorney for the organization can reasonably take on their
behalf. The attorney must act reasonably to protect the interests of shareholders or other
constituents of the organization to whom management owes fiduciary obligations.” Id.
154. David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 243–44 (1991).
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such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client’s situation.”155 We can imagine a state in which management’s only
affirmative mandate in a competitive takeover situation is to maximize value to
shareholders. What is the scope of advice that the attorney must give to a client
in this situation? The attorney should inform her client that the law requires the
board to accept the higher offer and the consequences of not doing so. The
attorney would be wise to see to it that the board of directors has reviewed
information about compensation to shareholders and that that review is well
documented. The attorney could also see to it that, in approving and rejecting
the various offers, the board cites information about value to shareholders in its
decision.156 Only after having accomplished those tasks has the attorney
satisfied her professional obligations, even if the client board violates its
fiduciary duties and decides to reject the highest takeover offer.157 The lawyer
may advise the board on the effects of the takeover on other constituents, but the
law does not require that decision-makers consider those effects in this narrow
situation. The lawyer’s advice on those matters would be superfluous to the
client’s decision.
Ethical rules, again, do not stand alone. Corporate law and other
considerations may require, either expressly or by implication, that attorneys
advise clients on the effects of corporation actions on nonshareholder
stakeholders. To the extent the law requires decision-makers to consider
nonshareholder stakeholders, however, the attorney’s duties dictate that her
advice must encapsulate those stakeholders under the same logic. Constituency
director duty statutes are statutes that sought to protect directors who consider
stakeholders beyond shareholders in their decision-making without giving
guidance on how to do so.158 Consider the attorney advising the Connecticut
client facing a takeover offer before 2010.159 The board of directors is under no
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
156. These are, to put it mildly, a gross simplification of the role an attorney plays in counseling
a client through a takeover. In many transactions, lawyers draft a “fairness opinion” that explains
the methods by which a party to a transaction arrived at a valuation and that, based on the
assumptions taken into account when making that valuation, the price paid in the transaction is fair.
See, e.g., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Laureate Education, Inc., A Public
Benefit
Corporation,
SEC
A-36
§
11
(Jan.
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912766/000104746917000434/a2230757zex-3_1.htm.
157. In the takeover context, the attorney gives information to corporate decision-makers that
allows them to protect themselves from future liability, including liability to shareholders for
breaches of fiduciary duty. See Hechler, supra note 132, at 946. The attorney helps create a process
that validates the board’s deliberation process. Id. Finally, the attorney advises the client on how
to strategically meet its objectives—one of which is to maximize value for the shareholders. Id. In
doing so, the attorney helps to ensure that boards of directors carry out the shareholders’ best
interests.
158. Millon, supra note 154, at 225 n.8.
159. Nathan E. Standley, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the Constituency Statute,
4 ELON L. REV. 209, 215–16 (2012). In 2010, Connecticut’s constituency statute was changed
from requiring that “a director of a corporation . . . shall consider, in determining what he
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obligation to choose the path that maximizes value to the shareholders, provided
that the board can document that it reviewed and deliberated on other relevant
information.160 Who, other than lawyers, are tasked with counseling decisionmakers on how to satisfy that burden? The attorney should provide the board
with that information, or at least document that the board has reviewed such
information. Advising clients on issues contemplated by Model Rule 2.1 seems
unlikely to be discretionary in these cases. The scope of advice will necessarily
expand and encapsulate these considerations.
Outside clear situations like these, attorneys choose to exercise the discretion
found in Model Rule 2.1 for a variety of reasons.161 Of course, to the extent that
“moral, economic, social and political factors” could give rise to claims against
a client by third parties or government regulators, the attorney should be sure to
include that information in her advice. Lawyers who monitor client exposure to
tort claims and enforcement actions must educate themselves and counsel clients
about the effects of corporate behavior on a large number of stakeholders and
others.
Lawyers also increasingly concern themselves with issues that, while they do
not present an immediately identifiable legal risk, pose business risk for their
clients. Enterprise risk refers to financial, strategic, operational, and other
risks.162 Though not purely a question of legal risk, attorneys are incorporating
advising on enterprise risk into their scope of work.163 Lawyers similarly advise
clients on so-called soft norms around issues like international human rights.
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding
Principles) are a nonbinding statement of suggested policies for states and
businesses around the world to integrate respect for and protection of human
rights into business practices.164 The Guiding Principles explicitly call for
companies to “[t]reat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights
abuses as a legal compliance issue.”165 Attorneys should elevate gross violations
of human rights to the same level of other identifiable legal risks without first
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation” a litany of interests to stating that
a director “may” consider those interests “in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.” Id. Before 2010, Connecticut was the only state with a
constituency statute that included this mandatory language. Id. at 216.
160. Id. at 212–16. See generally Norfolk S. Corp. v. Conrail, Inc., No. Civ.A 96-7167, 1997
WL 33463657, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 09, 1997).
161. See generally Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2027–30 (discussing how attorneys
conceptualize and advise clients on business risk).
162. Margaret
Rouse,
Enterprise
Risk
Management
(ERM),
SEARCHCIO,
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/enterprise-risk-management (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
163. Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2024, 2030 (discussing how attorneys conceptualize
and advise clients on business risk).
164. U.N. Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights 1 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciples
BusinessHR_EN.pdf [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
165. Id. at 25.

2019]

Who is the Client?

317

identifying an enforcement mechanism, essentially requiring attorneys to advise
their clients on whether they are engaging in and how to prevent violations of
human rights norms.166 The American Bar Association endorsed the Guiding
Principles, and in doing so noted that the Guiding Principles’ baseline of conduct
may touch on the discretionary issues on which Model Rule 2.1 grants attorneys
the ability to advise clients.167
Lawyers therefore already gather information about the social, economic, and
political impact of corporate action.168 Under the ethical rules, however, absent
a requirement that corporate officers and directors must take those factors into
consideration, there is no reason flowing from corporate law that the attorney
has to counsel a client on these issues when doling out legal advice to client
corporations.
Nonprofit lawyers will necessarily refer to moral, economic, social, and
political factors, as those are key to a director’s ability to satisfy her duty of
obedience. Surely a church director must consider the impact of her decisions
on her parishioners, or a soup kitchen director the impact of decisions on the
community her organization serves. The lawyer, who owes a duty to the
organization’s mission above any duty to its individual constituents,169 should
see to it that her nonprofit client’s decision-makers have sufficient information
to determine whether they are in fact fulfilling the organization’s mission.
Government attorneys will also refer to the political consequences of client
action when advising their government agency clients. Political here refers not
just to the electoral implications of government actions but to the client agency’s
place within the government structure and the impact of government action visà-vis other branches of government and within its client’s own branch.170
Government attorneys do not just advise policy makers; they often participate in
the creation of policy itself.171 This blurred status requires that attorneys pay
attention to and advise their clients on the implications of their actions on the
public and not merely the legality of government action.172
C. Attorney Liability
After considering lawyers’ obligations under ethical rules, it is next necessary
to assess the possibility of attorneys being held liable by beneficiaries of
organizational clients and other third parties for claims based in a violation of
166. Resolution, ABA, CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. 13, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/human_rights/hod_midyear_109.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
167. Id. at 1, 5 n.16.
168. See Regan & Hall, supra note 66, at 2024–30 (discussing that legal counsel regarding
“business risk” is distinct from the risk of legal liability).
169. Joseph Anthony Valenti, Know the Mission: A Lawyer’s Duty to a Nonprofit Entity during
an Internal Investigation, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 504, 517–20 (2010).
170. Rosenthal, supra note 90, at 32.
171. See Clark, supra note 89, at 1066–69.
172. Id. at 1062; Rosenthal, supra note 90, at 32.
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that organization’s legal purpose. Despite not being in an attorney-client
relationship with third parties, third parties may bring malpractice actions
against lawyers in some situations.173
Attorneys’ third-party liability for claims based in corporate law in the
corporate context is well understood.174 The Unary Model would suggest that
shareholders may be able to sue attorneys for malpractice if the corporation takes
actions that go against shareholder interests.175 Conversely, attorneys should not
be liable for claims arising under corporate law to nonshareholder constituents
for harms caused to them by corporate action.
Attorneys can in fact be found liable to shareholders under two theories:
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.176 States that have
been confronted with the aiding and abetting theory of attorney liability have
largely allowed a beneficiary to bring a claim against an attorney.177 To bring
these claims, shareholders need not show that the attorney owes the shareholder
a duty arising from the attorney-client relationship.178 Rather, it is sufficient to
show that the attorney “knowingly and actively participates in the breach of
fiduciary duties by another.”179 There are four elements of a successful aiding
and abetting in a break of fiduciary duty claim against an attorney: (1) that there
was a fiduciary duty owed; (2) that the fiduciary duty was breached; (3) that the
lawyer was aware of the fiduciary relationship;180 and (4) that the lawyer
substantially assisted in her client’s breach of the fiduciary duty.181
173. See Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nonclient Third Parties – At What
Cost?, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1–2 (1989).
174. Indeed, there is much case law and scholarship around lawyer liability to shareholders
and other fiduciary beneficiaries and third parties in the corporate context. See infra Section II.C.
The law remains undeveloped, and work needs to be done, on the potential of government and
nonprofit attorneys being held liable to organizational beneficiaries and other third parties.
175. See Pileri, supra note 69, at 183–86 (discussing how an attorney owes a duty to
shareholders through its duty to the corporation itself).
176. See Leonard E. Gross, What Duties Does Corporate Counsel Owe to Minority
Shareholders in a Closely Held Corporation, 35 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 987, 996–1005 (2009)
(discussing ways in which a lawyer can be held liable to a third party).
177. Brinkley Rowe, Note, See No Fiduciary, Hear No Fiduciary: A Lawyer’s Knowledge
within Aiding and Abetting Fiduciary Breach Claims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1389, 1397 (2016)
(noting that jurisdictions which have addressed aiding and abetting a breach of a fiduciary duty
claims have accepted them as valid).
178. See id. at 1396–97 (discussing the four elements that generally must be met to bring a
successful aiding and abetting claim, and noting that an attorney client-relationship between the
third party and attorney is not required).
179. Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers
for Aiding and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 145 (2008)
(quoting Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment, Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation:
Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 213,
241 (1996)).
180. See Rowe, supra note 177, at 1397–1412 (discussing various knowledge standards courts
use in aiding and abetting claims).
181. Lewinbuk, supra note 179, at 151–53.
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Aiding and abetting liability creates the possibility for lawyers to be held
liable for behavior that otherwise complies with rules of professional conduct.
If breaching a fiduciary duty to shareholders does not rise to the level of behavior
that triggers attorney reporting requirements, as discussed above, the attorney
may still find herself being sued by that shareholder for aiding and abetting her
client board’s action. Attorneys should, therefore, take potential breaches of
fiduciary duty up the corporate ladder, even if they are not clearly fraudulent. If
none of the persons with authority within a client takes action to remedy the
breach, the attorney should consider firing the client to avoid risking liability
herself.182
Negligence claims, on the other hand, can occur when the attorney breaches a
duty to the nonclient third party.183 According to the Restatement (Third) on the
Law Governing Lawyers, lawyers may owe a duty of care to nonclient third
parties who “rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services,”
to whom the “client intends as one of the primary objectives of the representation
that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient[,]” and when “the lawyer’s client
is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary acting primarily to perform similar
functions for the nonclient[.]”184 Many courts have adopted this standard when
adjudicating third-party claims against lawyers.185
Corporate lawyers risk being successfully sued for negligent representation
by shareholders harmed by corporate misconduct.186 When attorneys prepare
legal opinions and other documents that will be read and relied upon by
shareholders in making investments in a client company, attorneys may be liable
to the extent that those statements contain misrepresentations.187 Attorneys
182. At least one commentator feels that withholding information about an accounting report
from an owner/director who is later the target of a freeze-out based on information in that
accounting report will expose the attorney to liability for a breach of fiduciary duty to the
owner/director under a joint-representation approach to organizational representation rather than
an aiding-and-abetting theory. See Simon, supra note 34 at 72–73.
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., PNC Multifamily Capital Inst’l Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Bluff City Cmty.
Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 542–47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); Hesser v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co.
of Enid, 956 P.2d 864, 867 (Okla. 1998) (“[A] duty may be created by a contract which is made
expressly for the benefit of a third-party non-client beneficiary when harm to the beneficiary is
foreseeable.” (citing Bradford Sec. Processing Servs., Inc. v. Plaza Bank & Tr., 653 P.2d 188, 190–
91 (Okla. 1982))); Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Md. 1998) (stating that a nonclient “must
allege and prove that the intent of the client to benefit the nonclient was a direct purpose of the
transaction or relationship” (quoting Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985))).
186. See Gross, supra note 176, at 996–1005.
187. See, e.g., Greycas Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding an attorney
owed a nonclient creditor a duty not to negligently misrepresent the status of the borrower’s
collateral); Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. C. Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d 230, 236 (Colo.
1995) (finding attorneys who issues legal opinion letters with the goal of inducing reliance of a
nonclient liable for negligent misrepresentation); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1361 (N.J.
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ought to keep this standard in mind when preparing these documents. Is the
attorney describing accurately and in good faith the effect of some action on
shareholder value?
If not, does that omission rise to the level of
misrepresentation?
The law around attorney liability to third parties for claims grounded in
corporate law reflects corporate law’s acceptance of shareholder primacy.
Shareholders, as the primary beneficiary of corporate activity, may sue attorneys
when their clients fail to further their interests. Criminal or tortious behavior or
regulatory violations can lead to attorney liability to shareholders and other
parties.188 So, while attorneys may find themselves liable to shareholders when
corporate fiduciary duties are breached, liability to nonshareholder third parties
will not be based in corporate law.189
It is now possible to revisit Red Corp.’s attorney’s ethical obligations in more
detail in two specific contexts: first, in the case that a fiduciary of Red Corp. is
breaching a duty to Red Corp.’s shareholders and, second, in the case of a
constituent engaging in behavior that is harmful to a nonshareholder stakeholder.
In the first, the attorney has the option, though not the obligation, to raise her
concerns up the chain of command within her client corporation. Confidentiality
protects her from reporting this violation outside of the client corporation. If the
company is publicly traded, however, the attorney must go up the ladder within
the corporation if the violation is material and may ultimately report her
concerns to the SEC.190 She will advise her client on the legal and, perhaps,
business risk of this violation. She may also be liable to shareholders for aiding
and abetting the breach and, if she participated in crafting certain
representations, liable to those shareholders for negligent misrepresentation as
well.
Suppose, however, that Red Corp. is engaging in behavior that is harmful to
some nonshareholder constituent—dumping waste in a nearby river, for
example. If this activity is unlawful, the attorney’s reporting options and
obligations may be triggered. If it is not, the attorney is under no obligation to
go up the chain of the company and confidentiality prevents her from reporting
this activity externally. She will advise her client on the legal and business risks
of this activity, to the extent they exist, but is not required to advise her client on
the harmful effects of this behavior. If there is no criminal or civil liability
associated with the dumping, there is no violation for the attorney to aid and
abet. The attorney may find herself liable to third parties if they relied on
1995) (finding an attorney to a land owner assumed a duty to a nonclient purchaser to provide
reliable information regarding the land).
188. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 25, at 395–97 (discussing government enforcement action
brought against a large law firm on the basis of misrepresentation).
189. See id. at 400.
190. See Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-The-Ladder Reporting
By Insulting In-House Corporate Attorneys From Managerial Power, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 861,
863–64 (2015).
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statements by Red Corp. that Red Corp. is an environmentally responsible
company when transacting with Red Corp., but those claims would not be
grounded in corporate law.
The following sections explore these situations for the attorney representing
Green Corp., suggesting that a change in corporate purpose should result in
different ethical obligations for Green Corp.’s attorneys.
III. THE BENEFIT CORPORATION DEPARTS FROM TRADITIONAL CORPORATE
LAW
In order to understand how the benefit corporation will affect a lawyer’s
ethical duties, it is first necessary to understand what benefit corporations are
and what problem they were created to address. The benefit corporation’s
backers created the benefit corporation in response to the perception that
purpose-driven work can be done by nonprofit organizations alone and that
traditional corporate forms can conduct profit-driven work only.191 To these
advocates, corporate law, which requires that directors prioritize the interests of
shareholders above all else, prevents corporations from pursuing a mission.192
Benefit corporations are a response to two concepts found in corporate law:
shareholder primacy specifically and private law generally. Benefit corporation
legislation is designed to give founders and shareholders the ability to opt out of
a private law regime and into a public law regime, as well as avoid onerous tax
requirements and the prohibition on distributions to owners that limit charities’
ability to conduct commercial activity.193 In this next Section, I describe the
motivation behind the benefit corporation and its major features.
A. What Were Benefit Corporations Enacted to Address?
Movements emerged over the last several decades that attempted to move
corporate law, or at least corporate management practices, toward recognition
of the effects of corporate behavior on society at large. The Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) movement embraced the general principle that
corporations have a responsibility to society at large.194 Relatedly, progressive
corporate law sought to broaden the focus of corporate law and recognize that
the corporation is at its heart a “public institution with public obligations.”195
Progressive corporate law came to stand for “a loose term for a collection of
proposals aimed at remaking corporate law to encourage processes and
191. See generally Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009) (noting the distinct boundaries between non-profit and forprofit corporations and discussing how this boundary has been rejected by social entrepreneurs in
creating hybrid social enterprises).
192. Id. at 362; Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note 50, at 825–38.
193. See Plerhoples, supra note 7, at 542–43 (describing the statutory requirement for public
benefit corporations in Delaware).
194. Kelley, supra note 191, at 348–49.
195. MITCHELL, supra note 17, at xiii.
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outcomes more beneficial to the interests of nonshareholders with significant
stakes in a corporation’s activities (i.e., stakeholders).”196
In more recent years, a social enterprise movement also emerged. The social
enterprise movement seeks to use commercial methods to solve societal
problems traditionally associated with the charitable sector.197 To backers of
social enterprise, neither the traditional for-profit businesses nor charitable
sectors were suited to tackling major social issues. On the one hand, the forprofit sector was too focused on maximizing profits over the short-term at the
expense of nonshareholder stakeholders.198 The charitable sector, on the other
hand, faced too many regulations that limited the range of activities
organizations could undertake to address social issues.199
Again, the doctrine of shareholder primacy holds that corporate fiduciaries
must prioritize the interests of shareholders above those of all other
stakeholders.200 Shareholder interests are often defined as maximizing return on
investment,201 or at least economic interests.202 Maximizing return on
shareholder investment necessarily entails maximizing corporate profit.203
These movements argued that corporate law came to be seen as a matter of
purely private law that regulates the corporation’s relationship with its
shareholders, while other areas of law regulated the corporation’s relations with
stakeholders, such as employees or suppliers.204 Because corporations represent
the interests of their shareholders, founders lack a mechanism through which
they can ensure that a business sticks to its mission as it grows. New investors
will elect new directors who are not bound by the ideals and goals of the
196. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1352.
197. See id. at 1353 (“‘Social enterprise’ is a loose term for businesses that aim to generate
profits while advancing social goals.”); see also Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction:
Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective Impact Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 631
(2016) (“[S]ocial enterprises are businesses that make profits both for the benefit of the owners’
compensation as well as the advancement of a specific social purpose or mission.”); Plerhoples,
supra note 5, at 225 (“According to Social Enterprise Alliance, Inc., a non-profit organization that
promotes the goals of social enterprise, a social enterprise must ‘directly address an intractable
social need and serve[ ] the common good, either through its products and services or through the
number of disadvantaged people it employs.’ For others, social enterprise means ‘blended
enterprise’ or double or triple bottom line businesses—i.e., ‘entit[ies] that intend[ ] to pursue profits
and social good both in tandem and by making considered choices to pursue one over the other.’”
(citations omitted)).
198. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1362.
199. See id.
200. Smith, supra note 58, at 277–78.
201. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1018–19
(2013).
202. Id. at 1013.
203. Id. at 1018–19.
204. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 42 (2006) (noting how contemporary corporate law doctrine
overlooks the wellbeing of the corporation’s employees).
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corporation’s founders.205 This is precisely what happened with Etsy—
following an initial public offering, shareholders replaced the company’s board
of directors and prevented Etsy from converting into a public benefit
corporation.206
Tax-exempt organizations, on the other hand, face strict limits on their ability
to engage in commercial activities,207 have limited access to capital, and may
not compensate executives and others in a way that competes with the for-profit
sector.208 Further, nonprofit organizations are prohibited from distributing
profits to owners—a clear and insurmountable barrier to using profit-making
enterprises to address social ills.209
As a result of these two doctrines, social enterprise boosters believed that
traditional corporate forms were not suited to the task of social enterprise and
that new corporate forms were required to implement the dual social enterprise
mission.210 These new forms could “reduce transaction costs for aspiring social
entrepreneurs, provide them with conspicuous and inexpensive signals to
potential supporters who share their social aims, shape preferences by enabling
and encouraging prospective entrepreneurs to pursue broader social aims, and
nudge controller and employee behavior in more other-regarding directions.”211
New forms would allow social entrepreneurs to embed a social mission into the
organization’s organizational documents and signal that mission to consumers,
investors, and the public. These new entity forms that emerged are often referred
to as double- or triple-bottom-line entities because they incorporate social and/or
environmental outcomes in addition to financial results into their performance
metrics.212 Among those forms are the benefit corporation,213 the low-cost
limited liability company or L3C, special purpose corporation, and benefit
limited liability company.214

205. Kelley, supra note 191, at 359–60.
206. See Gelles, supra note 2.
207. “[C]haritable nonprofit organizations may nonetheless earn profits and engage in some
commercial activity, although income earned from business activities that do not contribute
importantly to the carrying out of the exempt purpose of the charity is subject to federal income
tax.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 1.01 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016).
208. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1362.
209. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 685–
86 (2013).
210. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1353.
211. Id. at 1373.
212. Roxanne Thorelli, Note, Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for Directors Within
Benefit Corporations: Requiring Priority of a Specific Public Benefit Note, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1749, 1750 (2017).
213. This is referred to as the Public Benefit Corporation in Delaware, Colorado, and
Minnesota. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–7-101-509 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)
(2018); MINN. STAT. § 304A (2018).
214. See Tu, supra note 113, at 142.

324

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:291

In order to understand how benefit corporations affect attorneys’ ethical
duties, it is important to understand exactly which features of traditional
corporations they sought to change. An analysis of the advocacy around the
adoption of benefit corporation legislation and the legislative history of these
statutes finds corporate law’s narrow focus on shareholder interests as a key
complaint of the form’s initial boosters. To the form’s founders, shareholder
primacy affected who has the ability to act on behalf of the corporation, what
duties those decision-makers owed, and what stakeholders other than
shareholders decisions makers were to take into account.215
The benefit corporation form was first proposed by William Clark of Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP. Clark wrote that “[i]t is against the paradigm of
shareholder primacy that directors and their advisors analyze corporate decision
making.”216 This paradigm, according to Clark, makes it difficult for for-profit
entities to incorporate a mission into their corporate purpose.217 Directors are
elected by shareholders, and so there is no one with decision-making authority
in the company who is accountable to or responsible for the interests of any
constituents aside from shareholders.218 Fiduciary duty law holds that directors
owe duties to shareholders alone and that it is, therefore, “difficult for the
directors of mission-driven companies to feel they are legally protected in
considering the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders who have
elected them.”219 Absent guidance and protections for directors contained in the
benefit corporation legislation, Clark reasoned that directors will not take
nonshareholder stakeholders into account and pursue a mission in addition to
profit.220
State legislatures similarly pointed to shareholder primacy and the shareholder
value maximization norm as the reason that states needed to create benefit
corporations.221 The New York Senate, for example, stated that “sociallyminded companies are often left with the catch-22 of either not being able to
earn a profit or opening their directors up to possible personal liability for
decisions that do not maximize shareholder value, or increasingly going to states
other than New York that are pursuing this corporate form” when passing their
statute.222 Likewise California legislators found that “[i]n a traditional
215. See William H. Clark et al., The Need And Rationale For The Benefit Corporation: Why
It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs Of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and,
Ultimately, the Public, BENEFITCORP.NET 14 (Jan. 13, 2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf (discussing the benefit corporation and the legal
uncertaintites faced by directors of for-profit mission-driven entities when making decisions for
their companies).
216. Id. at 8.
217. Id. at 7.
218. Id. at 8.
219. Id. at 10.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1, 8, 14.
222. S.B. 79, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
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corporation directors are required to utilize good faith in taking actions for the
best interests of the corporation and the shareholders. A main goal is to
maximize shareholder value. Directors are liable to shareholders in cases where
shareholders disagree with not-for-profit activities.”223 Clearly, state legislators
believe that corporate law elevates the interests of shareholders above all others
and embraces a private ordering regime and that a new corporate form was
required to allow mission-driven companies to pursue a public benefit in
addition to profit.224
The following sections describe features common to most benefit corporation
statutes. It is noteworthy that drafters of the benefit corporation statutes elected
the structure they did instead of other options that could result in more direct
nonshareholder influence on corporate governance. One such option would be
to set aside seats on the board of directors for representatives of nonshareholder
groups themselves, rather than a benefit director who is not required to be a
member of any particular stakeholder constituency.225 Drafters could also have
delegated responsibility for certain decisions away from corporate management
to stakeholders themselves, or perhaps made management accountable to
someone other than the board of directors and, therefore, the shareholders.226 By
rejecting these ideas, architects of the benefit corporation have embraced the
notion that the structure of corporate governance as currently practiced—a board
of directors elected by shareholders—is not an insurmountable impediment to
creating a public benefit. To these advocates, pursuing a public benefit is a

223. Flexible Purpose Corporations: Corporate Mergers, ASSEMBLY COMM . ON BANKING &
FIN.
5
(June
20,
2011),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_201_cfa_20110617_111833_asm_comm.html.
224. See also Final Bill Report SHB 2239, HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (June 7, 2012),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2011-12/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/2239-S%20HBR%2
0FBR%2012.pdf (stating that “[u]nder the WBCA, a corporation’s directors and officers have a
fiduciary duty to the corporation – an obligation to act in its best interests. This duty has been
interpreted as a responsibility to maximize financial returns for shareholders. The risk of liability
can arise for directors and officers if they make decisions on the basis of some mission, at the
expense of maximizing shareholder value. Such decisions could be interpreted as a breach of the
duty to act solely in the corporation’s best interests”).
225. Millon, supra note 154, at 147. The idea of incorporating stakeholder governance into
corporate law has been expressed by many scholars. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward
a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 49 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (noting
how giving stakeholders enforcement power could be accomplished by granting stakeholders board
representation); J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 61,
64 (2017) (advocating for the creation of “stakeholder advisory boards” to promote the
representation of “employees, creditors, customers, vendors, the community, and the
environment”); Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 311 (2011) (suggesting
corporate law reforms that “integrate[] stakeholders in corporate decision-making”). Many
European countries required that workers actually be represented on company boards of directors.
See Jackson, supra 225, at 310–11.
226. Millon, supra note 201, at 1019.
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question of management focus and to whom officers and directors owe a duty
rather than a structural issue.227
B. Benefit Corporations
Compared to other new corporate forms, the benefit corporation has been
adopted by the largest number of states228 and is the preferred corporate form of
choice for thousands of corporations,229 including double- or triple-bottom-line
entity corporations publicly traded.230 Many state statutes are based on the
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the “Model Legislation”),231 drafted by
the nonprofit organization B Lab.232 The Model Legislation has several features
that both represent a departure from the traditional corporate form and have
implications for lawyers representing these entities. A brief summary of these
changes follows.
Public Benefit: The Model Legislation provides that benefit corporations are
to have the purpose, enshrined in the company’s charter, of “creating a general
public benefit.”233 “General public benefit” is defined as “[a] material positive
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation assessed taking into account the impacts of
the benefit corporation as reported against a third-party standard.”234 Comments
to the Model Legislation note that this requires “consideration of all of the effects
of the business on society and the environment.”235 The benefit corporation also
has the option to adopt a specific public benefit purpose in addition to the general
public benefit purpose.236
227. See Millon, supra note 154, at 225 (discussing how these new corporate benefit statutes
impose new duties on management to consider the interests of communities and employees when
making decisions).
228. Social Enterprise Law Tracker, SOC. ENTER. L. TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/
(last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
229. Murray, supra note 3, at 589 (finding 2,636 entities organized as benefit corporations or
benefit LLCs as of 2015).
230. Gensler, supra note 12; see generally J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social
Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes, BELMONT U. (2015) (comparing different corporate
forms in various states).
231. Murray, supra note 225, at 86–87.
232. Mystica M. Alexander, Benefit Corporations – The Latest Development in the Evolution
of Social Enterprise: Are They Worthy of a Taxpayer Subsidy?, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 219, 245
(2014).
233. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. § 201(a), at 10 (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_9_16.pdf.
234. Id. § 102, at 3.
235. Id. § 102 cmt., at 6.
236. Id. § 201(b), at 10. The Model Legislation provides a suggested list of specific public
benefit purposes:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial
products or services; (2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities
beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring
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Consideration of Stakeholder Interests: The Model Legislation requires
directors to consider the impact of corporate action on non-shareholder
stakeholders and the public.237 The Model Legislation gives no guidance to how
the board of directors shall weigh the interests of these stakeholders;238 rather,
the Model Legislation states that directors need not give one group priority over
another unless doing so is specifically called for.239
Public Reporting and Third-Party Standard: Benefit corporations are to
prepare and make public annual benefit reports that describe, among others,
“[t]he ways in which the benefit corporation pursued general public benefit
during the year and the extent to which general public benefit was created” and
“[a]n assessment of the overall social and environmental performance of the
benefit corporation . . . against a third-party standard[.]”240 These third-party
standards, which report “overall social and environmental performance of a

the environment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the arts, sciences, or
advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of capital to entities with a purpose
to benefit society or the environment; and (7) conferring any other particular benefit on
society or the environment.
Id. § 102, at 4–5.
237. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations – A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 598–99 (2011). Boards of directors should consider their actions on a
variety of parties, including:
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (ii) the employees and work force of the
benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers; (iii) the interests of customers as
beneficiaries of the general public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose of the
benefit corporation; (iv) community and societal factors, including those of each
community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its
suppliers are located; (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the short-term and longterm interests of the benefit corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these interests may be best
served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation; and (vii) the ability of
the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit purpose and any specific
public benefit purpose[,]
in addition to any additional groups listed in the benefit corporation’s charter. Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(a)(1), at 12.
238. See id. § 301, at 12–13 (listing the factors the board of directors should consider when
making decisions); see also Reiser, supra note 237, at 610 (suggesting “[i]deally, a hybrid
organization would offer a solution to this dual mission dilemma. To solve it, a hybrid form of
organization should provide guidance on which goal, profit maximization or social good
production, has priority and in what situations this priority must be given. This does not necessarily
mean that either profit maximization or social good production must be prioritized every time the
two come into conflict. In order to ease the tension inherent in a dual mission organization, some
structure is needed for balancing these goals. This structure must work predictably and relatively
transparently, and there must be some method for enforcing it”).
239. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(a)(3), at 12.
240. Id. § 401(a)(1)(i), (a)(2), at 20.
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business[,]” are created not by legislatures but by organizations like B Lab241
that evaluate corporate activity and its social and environmental effects.242
Director Liability: The Model Legislation grants immunity to directors who
take the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders into account when making
decisions,243 or for their failure to pursue or create general public benefit.244
Further, directors have no duty to individual beneficiaries of the corporation’s
general or specific public benefit, and such individuals may not bring suit against
directors unless specifically authorized to do so in the corporation’s charter.245
Benefit Enforcement Proceedings: Although directors are not liable to
corporate beneficiaries themselves, directors, shareholders holding five percent
or more of the corporation’s stock, persons designated in the company’s charter,
or the benefit corporation itself may bring a “benefit enforcement proceeding”
against the company and its directors and officers for “failure . . . to pursue or
create a general public benefit” or other failure to comply with the requirements
of the Model Legislation.246 Parties who file “benefit enforcement proceedings”
may request injunctive relief only.247 There is no other claim that can be brought
against a benefit corporation or its directors for failure to follow the provisions
of the Model Legislation.248
Benefit Director and Officer: Benefit corporations may have a designated
benefit director, who is tasked with preparing the benefit report mentioned above
and overseeing the creation of a public benefit generally.249 Benefit
Corporations may also designate a benefit officer, who assists the benefit
director in the preparation of the benefit report.250
Though many states have based their benefit corporation statutes off of the
Model Legislation, the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Act, which became
effective in 2013,251 differs in several major respects. These differences are
important for attorneys representing Delaware public benefit corporations to
understand as they consider their ethical duties. For one, while Delaware public
benefit corporations do have to prepare written benefit reports for their
241. Id. § 102, at 5; see J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L.
REV. 25, 31 (2015).
242. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102, at 5.
243. Id. § 301(c), at 13; Reiser, supra note 237, at 598–99.
244. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(c), at 13.
245. Id. § 301(c)–(d), at 13.
246. Id. § 102, at 3, § 301 (c)–(d), at 13, § 301 cmt., at 14, § 305, at 18–19.
247. Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1805 (2018).
248. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102 cmt. Failure to create a
promised public benefit may, however, rise to the level of fraud, and the existence of the benefit
enforcement proceeding should not preclude a claim of fraud against benefit corporations. See
infra Section III.C (discussing fraud in the context of greenwashing).
249. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 302(a), at 14, § 302(c), at 15.
250. Id. § 304.
251. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2018).
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stockholders, they do not have to make those reports public and they do not have
to judge their efforts against a third-party standard unless so stated in the
certificate of incorporation.252 Rather than considering the interests of
nonshareholder stakeholders, directors of Delaware public benefit corporations
are to “balance[] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public
benefit or public benefits identified in [the corporation’s] certificate of
incorporation.”253 Delaware also does not provide for benefit enforcement
proceedings,254 though stockholders holding at least two percent of the
company’s stock can bring derivative suits for failure to abide by the statute’s
duties.255
A prominent example of a Delaware public benefit corporation is Laureate
Education, the first company organized as a benefit corporation in any state to
go public in the United States.256 Laureate Education defines its specific public
purpose in its certificate of incorporation as:
to produce a positive effect (or a reduction of negative effects) for
society and persons by offering diverse education programs delivered
online and on premises operated in the communities that we serve, as
the board of directors may from time to time determine to be
appropriate and within the Corporation’s overall education mission.257
No benefit director or officer is named to oversee this mission, and no group
or individual is granted the right to bring a derivate suit or any kind of
enforcement proceeding against the company.258 Further, the certificate of
incorporation does not require the company to judge its efforts against a thirdparty standard. Laureate Education is also a Certified B Corp., and so, while it
does not have to utilize a third-party standard under Delaware law, it does strive
to comply with B Corp. standards.259
252. Id. § 366.
253. Id. § 365(a).
254. Murray, supra 230.
255. J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation
Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 362–63 (2014) (comparing the Delaware and Model Legislation
to predict that neither will result in directors being held liable for failing to pursue a public benefit
and neither provides for substantial non-shareholder stakeholder governance).
256. Ashley A. Smith, Laureate Becomes Largest College to Become a Benefit Corporation,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/print/news/2017/02/02/laurea
te-beco...ollege-become-benefit-corporation?width=775&height=500&iframe=true.
257. Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Laureate Education, Inc., a Public
Benefit Corporation, SEC.GOV art. II, at 1 (Jan. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
912766/000104746917000434/a2230757zex-3_1.htm.
258. See id. art. VIII, at 12–14 (discussing the rights afforded to the board of directors and
shareholders, which do not mention derivative suits).
259. Laureate Education, Inc. Announces Renewal of Certified B Corporation® Status,
LAUREATE INT’L UNIVS’ (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.laureate.net/newsroom/pressreleases/2018/
01/laureate-announces-renewal-of-b-corp-status.
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C. Greenwashing
The drafters of the Model Legislation were particularly concerned with
guarding against greenwashing, which they defined as “the phenomenon of
businesses seeking to portray themselves as being more environmentally and
socially responsible than they actually are.”260 There are two ways that
greenwashing could be a violation of the Model Legislation—one based on
process and the other on outcome.261 A process-related claim of greenwashing
would entail the failure to abide by the reporting requirements of the Model
Legislation262 or the failure to consider the impact of corporate action on nonshareholder stakeholders and the public.263 An outcome-related claim, on the
other hand, would involve the failure to further a general or specific public
benefit, as measured against a third-party standard.264 Both should give rise to
benefit enforcement proceedings under the Model Legislation.265 Status as a
benefit corporation is a strong representation that a business is environmentally
and socially responsible; failing to create (or attempt to create) a general or
specific public benefit, therefore, constitutes greenwashing.266
Regardless of its basis, any greenwashing claim brought as a benefit
enforcement proceeding will need to overcome the business judgment rule.267
Like traditional corporate directors, benefit corporation directors are protected

260. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102 cmt., at 7. The term
“greenwashing” originally referred to organizations that falsely held themselves out as being
environmentally responsible, but it has expanded over time. See Jacob Vos, Note, Actions Speak
Louder than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 673, 673–74 (2009).
261. J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations
Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 85, 109–11 (2012).
262. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 401, at 20–21, § 102 cmt., at 7
(discussing how the purpose of the public benefit report is to keep the corporation accountable by
demonstrating it actually created a benefit for the public).
263. Id. § 301(a)(1)(i), (iii), at 12.
264. Id. § 102, at 3.
265. Id. § 102 cmt., at 6–7. A similar distinction between product and process has been
discussed in relation to international trade law, with “product” referring to information about the
product itself and “process” referring to how the product is produced, including “the labor
conditions of workers who produce a consumer good, the environmental effects of a good’s
production, the use of controversial engineering techniques such as genetic modification to create
a good, or any number of other social, economic, or environmental circumstances that are related
causally to a consumer product.” Dougalas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The
Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525,
528–29 (2004).
266. Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the
Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 589–90 (2012). In that way, Rasmussen College, in
failing to benefit its students as required by its corporate charter, was likely engaging in
greenwashing. See Plerhoples, supra note 7, at 561–62.
267. See Cummings, supra note 266, at 591–93.
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by the business judgment rule.268 Corporate law generally provides that if
directors exercise due care and reasonably believe that actions are in the best
interests of the shareholders and the corporation they will not be liable for
breaches of fiduciary duty.269 The business judgment rule exists to give
management a safe harbor for most decisions.270 The business judgment rule is
a broad defense and overcoming the business judgment rule in suits against
traditional corporations is difficult.271 Likewise, greenwashing claims brought
as benefit enforcement proceedings will need to show that directors failed to be
“informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the
director reasonably believes to be appropriate” and “rationally believes that the
business judgment is in the best interests of the benefit corporation.”272
IV. REPRESENTING THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
Benefit corporation legislation will necessarily impact legal ethics. The
“Framework of Dealing” embraces the Multiary Model for attorneys
representing benefit corporations.273 Nonshareholder stakeholders who are
intended beneficiaries of corporate actions come within the “Framework of
Dealing” insofar as the corporation is mandated to create a benefit for, or at least
consider its effects on, these shareholders.274 That is not to say, however, that
these nonshareholder stakeholders are the attorney’s client and that any duties
flow to them on account of being in an attorney-client relationship with the
lawyer. The nonshareholder stakeholder instead is in the position vis-à-vis the
attorney of the beneficiary of a trust or other fiduciary relationship; their interests
place bounds around actions that corporations can take and therefore also around
advice that attorneys can dispense, and the attorney must act to protect their
interests over the interests of individual directors and officers.275
The “Framework of Dealing” requires the attorney for the benefit corporation
to take into account both the changes to corporate structure brought about by
benefit corporation legislation and the altered corporate purpose. As discussed
above, the attorney must identify when a benefit director, benefit officer, or
shareholder has special authority within the corporation on matters of public
268. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(e), at 13.
269. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111–12
(1979).
270. See Johnson, supra note 108, at 448.
271. See id. at 440.
272. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(e)(2)–(3), at 13.
273. See Simon, supra note 34, at 89 (discussing how the Framework of Dealing embraces the
idea that the corporation does not have interests of its own but is only concerned with the interests
of its constituents); see also Pileri, supra note 69, at 186–87 (describing how the Benefit
Corporation embraces the Multiary Model, where an attorney, in owing a duty to the corporation
that must concern itself with a wide range of stakeholders and constituents beyond its shareholders,
also owes a duty to the public at large).
274. See Simon, supra note 34, at 98–103.
275. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 155.
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benefit. Second, the lawyer must guide her client toward taking into account or
furthering the purpose of the corporation as contained in the corporation’s
governing documents and corporate statute. In this Section, I attempt to analyze
those obligations in more detail under existing rules. In Section V below, I
propose several changes or clarification to existing rules and regulations.
A. The Citizen Lawyer
Representing benefit corporations requires a new framework that moves
norms for these attorneys away from the model of traditional corporate
representation. The current model of corporate representation is ill-suited to
representing clients like Green Corp. whose purpose is to further the public
interest. As explained above, these frameworks necessarily disregard the impact
of legal advice and client activity on nonclient third parties absent the
identification of legal risk arising from regulatory or legal requirements. Benefit
corporation legislation does not just impose an external requirement on
corporations that they produce a public benefit; rather, it attempts to embed that
purpose within the structure and duties that bind the corporation and its decisionmakers.276 Attorneys for benefit corporations should draw on other contexts,
such as those of nonprofit and government lawyers described above, in defining
this framework.
A historical perspective is also illustrative for benefit corporation lawyers. In
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, corporate law was seen as a public
ordering regime and it was accepted that attorneys also owed responsibilities to
the public.277 American corporations were viewed as public entities created by
the government rather than entities formed by contract.278 Early corporate
charters narrowly defined the scope of corporate authority.279 They also
acknowledged that corporations were created by the state and were public
entities serving a public purpose or public benefit.280 At that time, it was also
accepted that attorneys owed responsibilities to the public.281 Some describe a
“citizen lawyer,” who is tasked in the non-litigation context with “guiding the
client to comply with the underlying spirit or purpose as well as the letter of laws
and regulations to desist from unlawful conduct, and if needed, to do so with
strong advice backed by the threat of withdrawal, and in extreme cases, of
disclosure.”282 These earlier notions of the role of the attorney provide guidance
276. See Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1366.
277. GREENFIELD, supra note 204, at 30.
278. Id. at 35.
279. Id.
280. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1304 (2001).
281. See GREENFIELD, supra note 204, at 35.
282. Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some
Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2009) (citations omitted). However, the
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on how attorneys for benefit corporations should practice. Like lawyers of old,
lawyers for benefit corporations should incorporate as part of their counsel
guiding corporate decision-makers toward furthering public benefit and against
“socially destructive activity”283 since benefit corporations were designed to
prevent such activity.284
Rather than focus primarily on risks to their client, legal or otherwise, citizen
lawyers question the impact of client action on the rights of others and on the
legal system itself. The paradigm of the citizen lawyer plays out in the
transactional context as follows:
In advising clients outside litigation, the citizen lawyer is the “wise
counselor,” who sees her job as guiding the client to comply with the
underlying spirit or purpose as well as the letter of laws and
regulations to desist from unlawful conduct, and if needed, to do so
with strong advice backed by the threat of withdrawal, and in extreme
cases, of disclosure. If the client needs her help to resist or change
unfavorable law, she makes the challenge public and transparent, to
facilitate its authoritative resolution. Her private-minded counterpart
is of course the hired gun, whose sole concern is with minimizing
adverse effects of law on his client’s plans and profits. The neutral
version of the lawyer-agent simply identifies legal constraints and
advises clients on risks of detection and costs of noncompliance. The
aggressive or hardball lawyer-agent enthusiastically undertakes to
bend; stretch; punch loopholes in; and nullify by obstruction,
concealment, and delay the legal and regulatory constraints in the path
of a client’s desires and interests.285
The view of the lawyer as public citizen was explicitly adopted by the
profession around the turn of the twentieth century.286 Canon 32 of the original
1908 Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association admonished lawyers
not to provide any service or advice involving “deception or betrayal of the
notion of the citizen lawyer is by no means universally accepted. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding,
The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1399 (2003).
283. Allen, supra note 63, at 4. Louis Brandeis similarly argued in 1914 that a lawyer ought
to include legal reform in the daily practice of law. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION
316–17 (1914).
284. See Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102, at 6. A similar
professional duty counter to the zealous advocate is the duty of independent judgment owed to the
legal system itself and the substantive values that it incorporates. Allen, supra note 63, at 5. This
duty is especially relevant for transactional attorneys advising corporate clients as zealous advocacy
taken to its extreme in a transitional context would likely result in unacceptably negative external
social costs. See id.
285. Gordon, supra note 282, at 1174–75 (citations omitted).
286. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2395, 2452–64 (discussing how the 1908 Ethics Canon expanded conscientious lawyering by
holding lawyers morally accountable).

334

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:291

public.”287 The lawyer’s highest honor, according to these original rules, was to
be found in the fidelity to both “private trust” and “public duty.”288
The citizen lawyer was rendered archaic by the middle of the last century but
drew new attention after attorneys involved in the Enron scandal grounded their
defense of their role in the scandal in compliance with their professional
responsibility obligations.289 The turn of the twenty-first century, of course, saw
a series of corporate scandals, the largest of which was the Enron scandal.290
These scandals, and Enron in particular, caused scholars and practitioners to
question the wisdom of a profession that had no duty to the legal system itself
or the spirit of the law.291 In the Enron example, Enron’s attorneys implied that,
although they identified fraudulent accounting measures, they were not required
to report the use of such measures.292 The notion that purposeful concealment
of information used in fraud violates neither the law nor professional norms
undermined the respect of the legal profession in the eyes of the public.293
Following this wave of scandals, Chancellor Allen proposed a reinvigoration
of the norm of professional independence in which attorneys seek to further
client interests while at the same time “satisfying the underlying goals of the
law.”294 By doing so, lawyers would both further the purpose of regulatory
schemes and gain a competitive advantage by attracting clients interested in
furthering the goals of laws or regulations themselves.295 This paradigm,
according to Allen, would assist in the successful legal regimes and improve the
profession for its practitioners.296
Adherence to norms and clear understanding of the aims of regulation are
therefore essential to a functioning regulatory scheme—lawyers and clients must
be flexible when trying to achieve regulatory ends and, when such achievement
is impossible, transparent in their shortcomings for regulators to see and respond
to.297 Clients and attorneys who fail in this regard will find themselves at odds
with regulators and constantly striving to stay ahead of regulatory reform aimed
at curbing the very behavior in which they are engaged.298 Ethical norms aimed
at preventing corporate misconduct and bolstering the regulatory state both make
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

ABA Canon of Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 32 (1908).
Id.
Simon, supra note 6, at 1464.
Id. at 1453.
Allen, supra note 63, at 10–11.
Simon, supra note 6, at 1456.
See Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43
WASHBURN L.J. 61, 74–75 (discussing how the federal government responded to the Enron scandal
with direct federal regulation through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
294. Allen, supra note 63, at 11–12.
295. Id. at 12.
296. Id. at 14–15.
297. Simon, supra note 6, at 1462–63.
298. Id. at 1463.
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sense if we view the benefit corporation as a public ordering scheme. If benefit
corporations are accountable through corporate law to or for their effects on
nonshareholder stakeholders, attorneys should be mindful of those effects and
counsel their clients thusly. Further, if a benefit corporation is more than an
organization operating merely for the benefit of its owners,299 attorneys should
represent corporate clients with that regulatory state in mind.
Attorneys for benefit corporations should draw on the ideas of the citizen
lawyer. They should recognize that they owe a duty not just to their client but
also the public their client purports to benefit. They should seek to practice in a
way that furthers the mission of benefit corporation legislation, rather than
ensuring that their client complies with the letter of the Model Legislation only.
Finally, they should guard against the clients engaging in harmful behavior that
runs counter to the spirit of the Model Legislation.
B. Confidentiality and Reporting
Attorneys for benefit corporations should balance the duty to protect the
interests of nonshareholder stakeholders and the public against their
confidentiality obligations. This balance first affects how broad the circle of
confidently extends. The nature of benefit corporation legislation may bring
certain shareholders within that circle of confidentiality, at least with respect to
matters of public benefit and compliance with the authorizing statute. Further,
as with fiduciary breaches in traditional corporate law, certain reporting
obligations or options under the Model Rules and SOX may be triggered by a
client constituent engaging in greenwashing.
Again, the Model Legislation grants rights of action to certain shareholder
groups in the event of violation of benefit corporation legislation.300 Those
rights of action should bring those shareholders within the circle of
confidentiality. Since these shareholders can only bring suits for injunctive
relief in most states and are prevented from extracting any money from the
corporation, these shareholders have a form of internal control right. In
exercising that control right, these shareholders take the role of the “highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable
law.”301 The Model Legislation also allows benefit corporations to designate to
other parties the right to bring suit against the company for similar violations.302
Absent any ownership interest in the company, the third party’s connection with
the entity would be limited to being granted a right to sue.303 This position is
more comparable to a counterparty to a contract: the third party’s right to control
299. Or an agglomeration of contractual arrangements. See Millon, supra note 47, at 229–31;
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822–23 (1999) (describing the nexus-of-contracts).
300. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102, at 3, § 305(c), at 19.
301. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
302. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 305(c), at 19.
303. Id.
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corporate action is completely outside the corporate structure. These entities
should remain outside the circle of confidentially.
Doubtless, there will be benefit corporations that refuse or are otherwise
unwilling to make decisions that further the public good enshrined in their
governing documents. Some may ignore the effects of corporate action on
employees or customers or the environment before making a decision; others
may refuse to change course from a direction shown to be detrimental. Still
others will fail to satisfy some third-party standard for creating a public benefit.
Each is greenwashing by violating the benefit corporation purpose, analogous to
fiduciary breaches in the traditional corporate context.
For benefit corporations, greenwashing prompts many of the same questions
that traditional corporations’ attorneys face with breaches of fiduciary duties.
Greenwashing, again, refers to organizations that market themselves as being
environmentally sustainable or otherwise beneficial to the public, often taking
advantage of third-party certifications or corporate forms like the benefit
corporation, without actually creating the benefit they claim to promote.304 As
discussed above, whistleblowing or reporting obligations under the Model Rules
in the case of a breach of corporate purpose are weak.305 The rules offer little
guidance on when a violation of corporate purpose exists and, even if one is
identified, reporting is left to the attorney’s discretion. If breaches of fiduciary
duties to shareholders do not generally fall under the umbrella of reportable
activity under the Model Rules, then greenwashing should not either.
For publicly traded benefit corporations, SOX should include greenwashing
when committed by benefit corporations among the activities that trigger
reporting obligations.306 Under SOX, a “material violation” includes “a material
breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a
similar material violation of any United States federal or state law.”307
Greenwashing is a failure to create a “material positive impact on society and
the environment,” which is a requirement of creating a public benefit under the
Model Legislation.308 Harm to nonshareholder constituents that does not rise to
the level of fraud should nonetheless qualify as a “similar material violation”
under state law.309
Assuming that reporting options or obligations exist, identifying
greenwashing can be difficult. Acts that fail to further a public interest
contravene the purpose of benefit corporation legislation. Absent a clear
304. See Cummings, supra note 266, at 589–90.
305. See supra Section II.A.
306. Cummings, supra note 266, at 596–97.
307. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(h)(i) (2018). “Breach of fiduciary duty refers to any breach of fiduciary
or similar duty to the issuer recognized under an applicable Federal or State statute or at common
law, including but not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and
approval of unlawful transactions.” Id. § 205.2(d).
308. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102, at 3.
309. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(h)(i).
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showing of avoidable social or environmental harm, however, it may be difficult
for an attorney to ascertain what, exactly, constitutes behavior that is detrimental
to the public interest. The benefit corporation may identify stakeholders in its
governing documents whose interests the corporation seeks to further; harm to
those stakeholders should be seen a failure to further a public interest. We can
identify other parties harmed by greenwashing: shareholders who believe they
are investing in a socially and environmentally supportive corporation;
taxpayers and municipalities whose funds are being surreptitiously directed to
the greenwasher; competing benefit corporations competitively disadvantaged
by not greenwashing; and others. The purpose of the benefit corporation
legislation risks being undermined if the form is adopted only as a marketing
ploy.
Even if it can be determined that behavior harms the public interest, the
attorney then has to consider whether those actions are a “violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to
the organization.”310 For example, take the case of a difficult labor negotiation
for Green Corp. Corporate management may prefer a deal that pays its workers
lower wages or that cuts more jobs than another option. In looking at the two
options in isolation, it may appear clear that management chose the less
beneficial outcome based on its statement of purpose—creating jobs in local and
underserved communities. But, management could reasonably argue that it
chose the option it did because it felt that the other option would put the company
in such a fiscally and competitively disadvantaged position that the higherpaying jobs would be jeopardized entirely. Is the attorney to make the decision
that this decision was harmful to the public interest? Situations like these muddy
the water on both the goals and possibilities of benefit corporation legislation;
any whistleblower-type activity should focus on the corporate decision-making
process rather than the outcomes of those decisions.
As described in Section III.C above, greenwashing claims brought as benefit
enforcement proceedings can be based in process—failure to abide by the
requirements of the Model Legislation and consider stakeholder interests—or in
outcome—failure to create a general or specific public benefit. Failures of
process should be easier for lawyers to identify than failures of outcome. For
one, though outcomes are measured against third-party standards, it may be hard
for the attorney to determine whether a standard is truly met or how a benefit
corporation is affecting a particular stakeholder or set of stakeholders. This is
particularly true when a benefit corporation has stated more than one specific
public benefit. Suppose that Green Corp. cancels a contract with a heavily
polluting plant that happens to employ members of the community. Green Corp.
is acting to lower its environmental footprint, but in doing so goes against its
purpose to create jobs. Should the lawyer consider this a violation of its
310. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
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purpose? The Model Legislation provides little guidance on these questions.
Failures of process, however, may be easier to identify. In the above example
of the labor negotiations, the attorney should ask whether Green Corp.’s
management and directors considered the effects of a new labor contract on
employment in the local community rather than the outcome. In both examples,
if the attorney knows that Green Corp.’s management and directors are not
reporting their effects on employment, or failing to consider the employment
effects of their decision, the attorney’s reporting obligations may be triggered.
It is possible, however, that a benefit corporation may comply with the
procedural requirements of the Model Legislation in a pro forma manner only.311
By hewing to the form of the benefit corporation without following the spirit of
the benefit corporation statutes described in Section III.A above, greenwashing
is analogous to Simon’s “Agribusiness Welfare” example.312 “Agribusiness
Welfare” involves an agricultural company that divides its assets into a number
of smaller entities in order to take advantage of government subsidies intended
to benefit small farm owners.313 Each farm is the maximum size permitted to
receive funding under the federal program, though all farms are ultimately
owned by the same person.314 This division is clearly within the bounds of the
law, yet at odds with the intent of the statute’s drafters. This is similar to a
benefit corporation complying with the pro forma reporting requirements but
otherwise failing to further its public benefit. Under this sort of compliance,
Green Corp. would report that it had considered the interests of its employees
and the community without having truly internalized processes or making
decisions for their benefit.
Some schools of thought hold that there is no problem for the lawyer
structuring this transaction; the government will notice the defect in the program
and make the appropriate fix.315 The lawyer’s decision whether to advise the
client hinges on her own personal comfort with the scheme weighed against the
potential for lost income to the client. There is no greater ethical imperative for
the lawyer to caution against this course of action.316 This argument, however,
rests on the assumption that proper enforcement will lead to a statutory revision
outlawing the behavior in question. Should proper enforcement be lacking, the
benefit corporation attorney should counsel her client to not go forward with
transactions that fly in the face of a statutory objective that the government is
311. Callison, supra note 261, at 111.
312. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 4
(1998).
313. Id. at 4–5.
314. See id. at 5.
315. Many lawyers embrace a formalist view of the law—that the letter and not the spirit of
the law governs. Simon, supra note 6, at 1454. Those formalists believe that the law requires only
compliance with the letter of the law and that attorneys, therefore, should advise their clients on
meeting the letter of the law only. Id. at 1455.
316. See SIMON, supra note 312, at 165–66.
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unable or unwilling to enforce.317 The citizen lawyer advises against this
behavior because it runs counter to the spirit and purpose of the legislation.
Greenwashing flies in the face of legislation aimed at allowing the corporation
to pursue a public benefit and may also be counter to investor expectations.318
So-called “impact investors” explicitly seek out companies that produce some
public benefit to invest in, often with an expectation of less-than-market-rate
returns.319 Benefit corporation legislation contains no external enforcement
mechanism but rather leaves enforcement to public reporting and claims by
shareholders and other designated third parties.320 Should an attorney come to
the conclusion that this enforcement is inadequate, how should she proceed?
The attorney should endeavor to measure the client’s activities against a thirdparty standard to demonstrate a violation; even in states like Delaware where no
third-party standard is required, such a standard would bolster the attorney’s
defense to having violated her duty of confidentiality. If a client has designated
a specific beneficiary in its corporate documents, the failure to benefit that
beneficiary may be more readily measurable.321 For greenwashing activities
grounded in process, the attorney should see that weight was given to the benefit
corporation’s designated stakeholders or the public.
An attorney for a greenwashing client should not only advise her client against
engaging in this kind of behavior; she should consider reporting greenwashing
as provided under the Model Rules.322 Some greenwashing may rise to the level
of criminal or fraudulent activity, which clearly would trigger attorneys’
discretionary reporting obligations under the Model Rules in order to prevent
the illegal activity.323 Greenwashing can give rise to actions for fraud, violation
of state and federal fair trade practices laws, and violations of securities laws.324
If this activity is fraudulent or otherwise unlawful and has not yet occurred, the
attorney will be protected by Model Rule 1.6 and need not concern herself with

317. See id. at 164–66.
318. See Cadesby B. Cooper, Rule 10b-5 at the Intersection of Greenwash and Green
Investment: The Problem of Economic Loss, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 405, 414 (2015).
319. Deborah Burand, Contracting for Impact: Embedding Social and Environmental Impact
Goals into Loan Agreements, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 775, 776–81 (2017).
320. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301 cmt., at 14, § 305(c), at 19.
321. Id. § 301 cmt., at 14. The attorney may investigate the effect on the beneficiary, but
should be careful not to breach client confidentiality by speaking with the beneficiary about matters
related to her representation before making a determination that a material violation exists. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
322. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102 cmt., at 7.
323. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
324. Cooper, supra note 318, at 406–07; Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 289 (2014);
Joseph W. Price II et al., Even Courts Are Going Green: How to Protect Yourself from
Greenwashing Litigation, 48 WTR ARK. LAW. 22, 22 (2013); see generally Mary Ann Mullin &
Daniel J. Deeb, Policing of Green Claims, 26 SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 28 (2012).
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limiting disclosure to entities within the circle of confidentiality.325 A Texas
court, for example, relying on a rule similar to the Model Rule, allowed a lawsuit
to proceed against Enron’s lawyers for failure to disclose evidence of fraud
leading up to the scandal because their duty to would-be harmed parties,
including shareholders, trumped the duty of confidentiality.326 Ethical rules will
include this kind of activity in determine reporting obligations; the question of
duties in the event of activities that fall short of criminal activity is in question
in light of benefit corporation legislation.
In other situations, the attorney must determine to whom she can or must
report greenwashing. Since some shareholders of a benefit corporation are in a
similar position as that of shareholders in a closely held corporation, they may,
by virtue of their position, fall within the circle of confidentiality. Reporting
greenwashing to these shareholders should not violate the attorney’s duties of
confidentiality in the way that reporting breaches of fiduciary duties to
shareholders in a publicly traded or widely held corporation would. Attorneys
will have broader leeway when representing benefit corporations to report
greenwashing up the corporation chain of command all the way to shareholders,
provided that the attorneys are mindful to report only to those shareholders who
are explicitly granted a right to control corporate behavior by bringing a benefit
enforcement proceeding. Many benefit corporations also have directors and
officers specifically designated to oversee benefit creation.327 These positions
should similarly constitute “the higher authority in the organization” and, should
they fail to act, shareholders with a right to bring benefit enforcement
proceedings would make up the highest level of authority.328 Attorneys who
report greenwashing should report first to benefit officers and directors and,
finally, shareholders allowed to bring a benefit-related right of action against the
corporation and its directors. Under SOX, after going to the highest authorities
within the corporation (the board and shareholders), the attorney would have the
discretion to report greenwashing to the SEC.329
C. Scope of Advice
When representing a benefit corporation, the “moral, economic, social and
political factors” that Model Rule 2.1 leaves to attorneys’ discretion are integral
to an attorney’s advice.330 Three factors give rise to attorneys’ obligations to
advise her benefit corporation client on these issues. First, as guardians of the
325. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
326. See Catharine E. Stark, Regulating Corporate Governance: Amended Rules of
Professional Conduct Allow Lawyers to Make the World a More Ethical Place, 53 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1195, 1210 (2004).
327. See Plerhoples, supra note 3, at 252.
328. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b)(3) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018); Callison,
supra note 261, at 96; see generally Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002).
329. See discussion supra Section II.A.
330. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
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public interest in addition to shareholder interests, directors and officers of
benefit corporations must be informed on how their actions will affect the public
in the same way that directors and officers must know how corporate action
affects shareholders.331 Second, the attorney must inform her client of new legal
risks that may arise as a result of failing to promote the public good.332 Third,
the attorney risks being liable to third parties herself if the client engages in
greenwashing or other nonbeneficial behavior and corporate decision-makers
are not informed of the full effects of that behavior.333
As guardians of not just shareholder but also public interest, benefit
corporation directors and officers must be informed on how their actions will
affect the public in the same way that corporate directors and officers must know
how corporate action affects shareholders, and government workers and
nonprofit executives need to know the effect of their actions on the public and
their mission, respectively. Decision-makers simply cannot do their job without
that information. Attorneys are not the only source of information about these
issues, nor are they are on price per share in competitive takeover situations.
That said, officers and directors look to attorneys for guidance on these issues
nonetheless, and attorneys should expect and be able to dispense this advice.
Benefit corporations also face potential new legal and business risks on
account of their commitment to furthering a public benefit. The greenwashing
example illustrates this well. Benefit corporations that purport to, but do not
actually create a public or specific benefit, as required by each corporation’s
governing documents, face the potential of lawsuits from stakeholders and
designated third parties. Social and political issues could give rise to benefit
enforcement actions. They could also have potential effects on tax deductibility
of certain payments334 and municipal and state funding sources.335 Failure to
further a public benefit also could pose enterprise risk to a client. Should Green
Corp. operate in a way that pollutes a nearby river, for example, a benefit
enforcement proceeding could be brought for failing to lower its environmental
footprint. Any government contracts it won on the basis of its benefit
corporation status could be in jeopardy. Investors and customers may respond
negatively, refusing to invest in or purchase products from the company. This
is all in addition to any regulatory risk that could arise. All of these
331. Plerhoples, supra note 3, at 255–257.
332. See Pileri, supra note 69, at 186.
333. Gross, supra note 176, at 996; Lewinbuk, supra note 179, at 145–46; Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102 cmt., at 7.
334. Letter from Karin G. Gross, Senior Technical Reviewer, Internal Revenue Serv. (June 2,
2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/16-0063.pdf. “[A] nonstock benefit corporation making an
expenditure for institutional or goodwill advertising to keep the corporation’s name before the
public is generally treated as [a deductible] expense.” Id.
335. Several states and municipalities have granted benefit corporations bidding preference for
government contracts. Michelle Baker, Socially Responsible Businesses Get a Boost from Local
Governments, NONPROFIT L. BLOG (May 8, 2013), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/sociallyresponsible-businesses-get-a-boost-from-local-governments/.
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considerations expand the universe of risk on which attorneys are accustomed
to advising clients.
With respect to claims brought against directors and benefit corporations
under authorizing legislation, ensuring that the corporate client has reviewed
information regarding the benefit to nonshareholder stakeholders, the
environment, and others assures that directors will help retain the protection of
the business judgment rule. Much as the business judgment rule now protects
directors who adequately inform themselves before making corporate
decisions,336 a showing that benefit corporation directors looked at the effects of
a decision on employees, community members, the environment, and others
should help to keep them within the safe harbor provided by the business
judgment rule. This is particularly true when moral, social, economic, political,
or environmental issues have a direct effect on one of the client corporation’s
stakeholders. Even if the result of corporate action is negative on the
environment or a particular constituency, directors should have a clear record
that they reviewed information relevant to the effect on those groups to protect
themselves and their clients. This is particularly true given the lack of guidance
about how benefit corporations should prioritize the interests of various
stakeholders.337 Procedural considerations, therefore, should be a priority for
attorneys.
Although benefit enforcement proceedings have yet to materialize and the
jurisprudence around them is nonexistent, courts are instructed to apply the
business judgment rule to questions of public benefit.338 Legislatures recognize
that it is no more possible to legislate beneficial outcomes than it is to legislate
profitability.339 In the Revlon line of cases, litigants will likely need to make a
showing that the board of directors either had inadequate information regarding
public benefit or that they did have such information for two or more potential
outcomes and purposefully chose an outcome that they knew to be detrimental
to the public benefit to be successful in their claims.340 The dutiful attorney will
have counseled her client to review this information before making a decision
and, by doing so, will have satisfied her pre-decision ethical duties.
Third, lawyers risk liability to third parties if their clients fail to produce their
promised benefit.341 Self-preservation will necessitate an expansion of the scope
of advice that lawyers for benefit corporations give. Documented evidence of
advice on broad impacts of corporation action, particularly on key stakeholders,
336. Millon, supra note 201, at 1035.
337. See Reiser, supra note 237, at 607–10.
338. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(e), at 13.
339. See Cummings, supra note 266, at 602.
340. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183–
85 (Del. 1986) (holding that directors were not protected by the business judgment rule when they
breached their duty of care in allowing interests aside from maximizing shareholder profits to
influence their decision to sell the corporation).
341. See Gross, supra note 176, at 996.
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has the potential to create a safe harbor of accepted practices in which attorneys
can protect themselves from outside claims. The advice falling within this safe
harbor is sure to look very similar to the advice left to the lawyer’s discretion
under the Model Rules. For a more in-depth discussion of attorney liability, see
Section IV.D below.
As stated in Section IV.A, the passage of benefit corporation legislation
necessitates a return to the citizen lawyer. The inclusion of moral, social,
economic, political, and environmental issues within the scope of advice that
attorneys dispense harkens back to the citizen lawyer. The interests of others
will no longer be something distinct from and in competition with the interests
of her client; benefit corporation legislation requires that client interests and the
interest of others be fused.342 To advise on these other subjects is not to insert
the lawyer’s political or moral judgment ahead of that of her client’s. Rather,
doing so complies with her obligation under the Model Rules to assess the array
of legal and, increasingly, business effects of corporate action.343
Citizen lawyers do not ignore issues of legal risk; rather, they see them as a
floor. Advising clients on how to comply with those requirements is a baseline
for good lawyers; attorneys should strive to counsel clients to go above those
rules and benefit the public. Citizen lawyers, particularly, do not limit their
counsel to complying with statutory minimums or mitigating risks alone.344
These lawyers look to the effect of client activity on various stakeholders, on the
public, and on the legal system in which they operate and advise their clients
thusly.345 In Section V below, I suggest an amendment to the Model Legislation
that should bring attorney behavior in line with this expectation of ethical
lawyering.
D. Attorney Liability
Again, attorneys can be found liable to a client’s shareholders under two
theories: aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.346 To
bring a successful aiding and abetting claim, would-be plaintiffs will need to
show that a fiduciary relationship existed.347 Shareholders could bring a claim
against a greenwashing benefit corporation on the theory that failure to promote
a public benefit contradicts a consideration under which the shareholders
purchased shares. Under such a theory, greenwashing would need to so grossly
controvert the benefit that the shareholder intended as to overcome the business
judgment rule and violate the duty of care. Benefit corporation legislation does
not leave enforcement of benefit to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, of course.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301, at 12.
Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 160.
Gordon, supra note 282, at 1169.
Id.
See Gross, supra note 176, at 996–1005.
Id.
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The statutes (with the notable exception of Delaware) create a new and distinct
benefit enforcement proceeding.348 And, because those actions may only seek
injunctive relief, it is unlikely that aiding and abetting liability could attach to
them; the purpose of the legislation was to provide shareholders with a control
mechanism rather than a mechanism by which they could extract money from
the company or its directors. 349 Attorneys representing benefit corporations may
be liable under a negligence standard to both shareholders and nonshareholder
third parties if their client corporation engages in greenwashing or otherwise
fails to promote a public or specific benefit, but probably not under an aiding
and abetting standard.
For third parties to bring an aiding and abetting claim against counsel, those
parties would have to show that corporate fiduciaries owed to them and breached
a fiduciary duty.350 This may be more than is possible under benefit corporation
legislation. Directors must consider the impact of their actions on third parties,
but nothing in the Model Legislation grants those parties a right to enforce that
benefit absent a specific delegation of that right.351 The same is true under
SOX.352 SOX leaves room for “similar material violations” that trigger attorney
reporting obligations,353 but SOX does not create a private right of action for this
type of violation. Absent an underlying violation, there is nothing for the
attorneys to aid and abet.
Negligence provides a clearer possibility of attorney liability to third parties
when representing benefit corporations. Again, shareholders will rely on a
variety of statements and documents when investing in a client company. In the
case of a benefit corporation, many investors will look to governing documents,
impact-related reports and disclosures, and perhaps the fact that the company is
incorporated as a benefit corporation when making an investment. Lawyers will
doubtlessly be involved in both the creation of these documents and the
evaluation of the company’s impact. Third parties like customers, vendors,
employees, and others may also rely on that information when entering into
transactions with benefit corporations. These third parties could be seen as the
party whom the benefit corporation “intends as one of the primary objectives of
the representation that the lawyer’s services benefit[,]”354 particularly if that
party is named in the client’s governing documents or impact reporting.

348. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 101 cmt., at 2.
349. See id. § 302 cmt., at 15.
350. Lewinbuk, supra note 179, at 145–46.
351. Reiser, supra note 237, at 598–99.
352. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(d), (h)(i)–205.3 (2018).
353. Id. § 205.2(d). “Breach of fiduciary duty refers to any breach of fiduciary or similar duty
to the issuer recognized under an applicable Federal or State statute or at common law, including
but not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of
unlawful transactions.” Id.
354. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
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Litigation that followed the savings and loans scandals of the 1980s hints at
how nonshareholder stakeholders could hold attorneys liable for harmful
activities of benefit corporation clients. In those cases, receivers and bankruptcy
trustees sued debtors’ attorneys following the collapse of the savings and loan
institutions alleging, among other things, professional negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty for behavior that primarily
harmed creditors.355 In these cases, creditors harmed by corporate action sued
lawyers alleging that the lawyers breached their duty to their client
corporation.356 In allowing claims against the attorneys to go forward on the
basis of the lawyers having violated a duty to the corporation,357 courts implied
that creditors ought to be included in the group to whom the attorney owes a
duty. The courts allowed these claims even though the acts in question were
approved by management and intended to benefit shareholders.358 Observers
noted that this suggested, though did not outright hold, that the corporation has
some duty to creditors in situations approaching bankruptcy and that lawyers are
required to act in the best interests of those creditors in those situations.359
Extending this logic to benefit corporations, lawyers should have a similar duty
vis-à-vis nonshareholder constituents, and attorneys may be liable to those
constituents for harm caused them by corporate action.
V. SUGGESTED REFORMS
I have attempted to interpret lawyers’ ethical obligations flowing from the
Model Legislation, but it is likely that attorneys’ obligations when representing
benefit corporations will remain unclear. This is a common complaint of nonlitigators operating under rules designed for litigation.360 This will be doubly
true here, given that ethical rules and malpractice law developed out of a private
law-ordering understanding of corporate law. Greenwashing is an especially
difficult situation for the reasons discussed above. This Article, therefore,
suggests reforms that seek to clarify attorneys’ ethical duties in these situations.
First, this Article recommends expanding the scope of advice that attorneys must
give their benefit corporation clients to include the social, political,
environmental, and other effects of corporate action on the corporation’s many
stakeholders and the public at large. Second, this Article proposes reporting
obligations for attorneys who become aware that their benefit corporation clients
are engaging in behavior that negatively affects nonshareholder stakeholders or
committing greenwashing.

355. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 82 (1994); FDIC v. Nathan, 804 F. Supp. 888,
891 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
356. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 82; Nathan, 804 F. Supp. at 891.
357. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 79, 83, 89; Nathan, 804 F. Supp. at 898.
358. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 82; Nathan, 804 F. Supp. at 896.
359. Simon, supra note 34, at 101–03.
360. See, e.g., Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2002.
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These reforms have the added benefit of bolstering benefit corporation
legislation. The government may deputize attorneys in the effort to create public
good through these entities and guard against greenwashing.361 Unlike nonprofit
and tax-exempt organizations, government agencies like state attorneys general
and the IRS do not normally have a direct role in enforcing public benefit and
guiding against greenwashing. The Model Legislation purposely grants that
responsibility to shareholders; placing attorneys in that enforcement scheme
would not run counter to the goals of the legislation or create conflict between
private and public enforcement.
These reforms also hold potential benefits for lawyers. They should serve to
clarify standards of care, helping lawyers avoid liability, and give attorneys tools
to increase their value for social entrepreneurs and benefit corporation clients.
Rules of professional conduct do not necessarily create standards of care when
determining liability, leaving confusion for courts and attorneys attempting to
decipher lawyers’ obligations. Clarifications such as these can help to resolve
that confusion.362 These standards should also make lawyers more marketable
to business clients who are serious about pursuing the public benefit set forth in
their organization’s governing documents. Business clients already expect
lawyers to guide them through complex regulatory apparatuses and lower
transactions costs when guiding clients in various transactions.363 As a result,
lawyers already play an outsized role in structuring transactions for business
clients.364 When benefit corporations enter into transactions, their governing
law will require that they look to create a public benefit through their dealings
or be mindful that stakeholders and the environment are not harmed.365 Since
lawyers are already deeply involved in the structuring of business deals, lawyers
who can show they are able to advise clients on mission in addition to the work
they traditionally do will be very desirable to the client. By embedding those
duties in legislation and ethical codes, prospective clients will be able to
anticipate that lawyers are already in the business of dispensing advice on
mission and public benefit.
Any reform poses the question of which authority is best suited to make the
reform. For attorneys representing benefit corporations, two options are state
bar associations that promulgate rules of professional conduct and state
legislatures or state agencies that oversee the registration and regulation of
corporate entities.

361. SOX was similarly passed to respond to a wave of large corporate scandals around the
turn of the twenty-first century, the most prominent of which was the Enron scandal. Cramton et
al., supra note 21, at 727–28, 735–36.
362. See Munneke & Davis, supra note 39, at 34.
363. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 246 (1984).
364. See id. at 241–42.
365. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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Bar associations promulgate rules of professional ethics and issue opinions
and other statements interpreting and applying those rules.366 As self-regulating
bodies, bar associations may have different priorities than legislatures and
therefore different reasons for changing rules. The relationship between rules
of professional conduct and attorney liability is a complicated one, as violations
of rules do not always give rise to liability and behavior that complies with the
rules could still be negligent. Bar associations may attempt to clarify their
member’s obligations but are not in a position to create practices and procedures
that, if followed, will completely exonerate their members from any liability.
Their motivations for changing rules, however, differ from the motivations of
legislatures passing benefit corporation legislation.
State legislatures or regulatory agencies exercising rule-making authority are
better positioned to adopt these suggestions. Legislatures already passed benefit
corporation legislation and delegated certain authority under that legislation to
state agencies.367 Legislatures could make determinations about how and why
attorneys should work to create public good and, along with relevant agencies,
how attorneys should be marshaled in service of that goal. As discussed, the
IRS368 and SEC,369 for example, already have rules that apply specifically to
attorneys practicing before them or representing companies governed by their
regulations that add additional obligations to those contained in state rules of
professional responsibility. These rules would also create a clear legal standard
of care, a violation of which may create a basis for a negligence per se claim
against attorneys.370 Doing so may help attorneys avoid liability by granting
them the chance to show that they complied with their statutory obligations.
Finally, by adding these suggestions to the laws and regulations governing
benefit corporations in a given state, these obligations would become part of the
system into which founders and investor opt. This avoids complicated questions
of extra-jurisdictional application: might clients choose lawyers based on the
rules governing their practice rather than the law governing the entity?
366. See, e.g., Resolution, supra note 166, at 1.
367. See, e.g., MINN STAT. § 304A (2018).
368. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.37 (2018).
369. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–205.7 (2018).
370. The relationship between violations of law and ethical violations for attorneys and
between violations and attorney malpractice is far from settled. In the words of a South Carolina
court:
A majority of courts permit discussion of [legal] violation[s] at trial as some evidence of
the common law duty of care . . . . These courts generally rule that the expert must address
his or her testimony to the breach of a legal duty of care and not simply to breach of
disciplinary rule . . . . Other Courts have held that ethical standards conclusively establish
the duty of care and that any violation is negligence per se . . . . A minority find that
violation
of
an
ethical rule
establishes
a rebuttable
presumption
of legal malpractice. And, finally, a few courts hold that ethical standards are
inadmissible in a legal malpractice action.
Smith v. Haynsworth, 472 S.E.2d 612, 613–14 (S.C. 1996) (citations omitted).
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A. Scope of Advice
Benefit corporation legislation will also affect the scope of advice that
attorneys give benefit corporation clients, though this too would benefit from
clarity. While many attorneys advise clients on enterprise risk and soft legal
norms,371 that advice still focuses primarily on risk to the client rather than on
the rights of third parties. Lawyering to a benefit corporation, however, should
require that attorneys place the effects of their clients’ behavior on
nonshareholder stakeholders foremost when giving counsel. To facilitate this,
states should clarify that attorneys representing benefit corporations must advise
corporations on the social, political, environmental, and other impacts of
corporate action on the corporation’s many stakeholders and the public at large.
The following language should be added to the Model Legislation:
Benefit Corporations shall treat the risk of failing to create a general
public benefit or specific public benefit, or to consider the effects of
any action or action upon the parties listed in Section 301(a)(1) of the
Model Legislation, as a legal compliance issue wherever they
operate.372
The United Nations did something similar when they approved the Guiding
Principles in 2011.373 Following the enactment of the Guiding Principles, the
American Bar Association affirmed that advising clients on human rights norms
aligned with the requirement in Model 2.1 to provide candid advice.374
Accordingly, the effects of corporation action on intended beneficiaries and
other nonshareholder stakeholders should qualify as “other considerations such
as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the
client’s situation.”375 As is the case with violations of international human rights
norms, this change requires that benefit corporations and their attorneys evaluate

371. See Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2002 (discussing how attorneys evaluate and
advise clients on business risk related to international human rights issues).
372. The terms “general public benefit” and “specific public benefit” shall have the same
definitions as in the Model Act.
373. See generally Guiding Principles, supra note 164, at 1 (suggesting policies for states and
businesses around the world to integrate a respect for and protection of human rights into business
practices).
374. Specifically,
It bears noting here that ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 may well apply
in this context. It requires lawyers to exercise “independent professional judgment and
render candid advice” and permits them to “refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant
to the client’s situation”. This imperative logically would include applicable
international standards in the conduct of a client’s affairs, including the Framework and
Guiding Principles where corporate clients are concerned.
Resolution, supra note 166, at 5 n.16 (citation omitted).
375. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
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the effects of corporation action on the same level of other identifiable legal risks
without first identifying an enforcement mechanism.376
The IRS has taken the approach of limiting the scope of advice that attorneys
may give when dispensing written legal advice.377 For example, 31 C.F.R. §
10.37 states that attorneys may not “take into account the possibility that a tax
return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit” in written
advice.378 This accomplishes similar ends to what I propose. One, it ensures
that the IRS’s capacity to bring an enforcement claim is not the sole determinant
of whether individuals and entities comply with (or attempt to comply with) tax
law. Second, it requires lawyers to evaluate client behavior in a way that is
distinct from legal risk alone but rather focuses on the effects and legality of
client actions. That said, applying to written advice only leaves space for
attorneys to orally advise of the odds of enforcement. Altering the scope of
advice that attorneys may give is therefore not an entirely novel concept, and
states should look to this approach to strengthen and clarify their benefit
corporation laws.
B. Reporting
Second, states should create a reporting requirement and process for attorneys
who are aware that their benefit corporation clients are failing to promote a
public benefit. This proposal attempts to close the gap between discretionary
and ambiguous obligations found in the Model Rules to report violations of law
and obligatory requirements under SOX to report “similar violations” to
violations of fiduciary obligations.379 Under this proposal, the same sort of
activities that give rise to benefit enforcement proceedings under the Model
Legislation will give rise to lawyers’ reporting duties.
This proposal draws heavily from the rules promulgated by the SEC under
SOX. Should the attorney “become aware of” a triggering activity by a client
constituent, she is first to report to the benefit officer, should one exist.380 If that
person fails to act, she then goes to the benefit director, the board of directors,
and ultimately shareholders or other parties granted a right to bring benefit
enforcement proceedings against the company. Unlike SOX, she does not have
the option to report to the state agency, as the state agencies have few
enforcement powers over the benefit corporation.381 Her final resort in the face
of inaction by her client’s officers and directors is to resign from the
representation.
376. Resolution, supra note 166, at 5.
377. 31 C.F.R. § 10.37 (2018).
378. Id. at § 10.37(2)(vi).
379. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(d) (2018).
380. Id. § 205.3.
381. Should a state’s benefit corporation legislation contain this kind of enforcement, the state
agency charged with carrying out that enforcement may also be an appropriate party to whom the
attorney may report greenwashing.
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This formulation presents several positive aspects for both attorneys and
backers of the benefit corporation movement. First, the obligations are clear, or
as clear as they can be under this new scheme. The standards for “become aware
of” are hotly debated,382 but this language at least tracks with SOX language,
allowing ample opportunity for courts to give definition to this term. Second,
while it is not yet clear what kind of behavior will be found to violate benefit
corporation legislation, rules around reporting can develop in tandem with
benefit enforcement proceedings as they are brought and adjudicated.
Reporting to third-party beneficiaries, as proposed here under limited
circumstances, has not been widely recognized.383 For that reason, the proposed
rule will state that the attorney may disclose only upon making a good faith
determination that disclosing a triggering behavior to third parties is in the
interest of the client corporation and that the third party is granted a right to sue
or other control right.
C. General Considerations
As with proposed SOX rules and the amendments to the Model Rules384 that
followed the Enron scandal, any proposed change to attorneys’ ethical duties is
sure to encounter pushback. It is likely in this case that pushback would focus
not only on the effect of changes on the attorney’s relationship with her client
but also on the nature of benefit corporations themselves. Many feel that the
protections for directors in the Model Legislation are not required because
corporate law does not actually expose directors and officers to liability should
they consider the effects of corporate action on nonshareholder stakeholders.385
If benefit corporations do not actually change corporate law in any meaningful
way, it should follow that attorneys’ professional responsibility obligations
should not change either. That said, even if traditional corporations are not
precluded from pursuing a mission if doing so comes at the expense of profit to
the shareholders, are lawyers’ duties totally unaffected? The attorney must still
382. Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 756–59.
383. But see HAW. PROB. R. § 42(b). Hawaii Probate Rules state that a lawyer representing a
trust owes a duty to notify beneficiaries of certain issues. Id.
An attorney for an estate, guardianship, or trust does not have an attorney-client
relationship with the beneficiaries of the estate or trust or the ward of the guardianship,
but shall owe a duty to notify such beneficiaries or ward of activities of the fiduciary
actually known by the attorney to be illegal that threaten the security of the assets under
administration or the interests of the beneficiaries.
Id.
384. Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 727–33.
385. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable
Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 659 (2013) (disputing the benefit
corporation’s ability to promote the idea of corporate social responsibility, alleging its structure
creates a false dichotomy between benefit corporations and business corporations and is practically
unworkable); see generally Callison, supra note 261, at 105 (claiming the benefit corporation form
is based on a flawed premise of shareholder primacy).
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understand the law governing the client’s organization and how to ascertain the
identity of the client’s duly authorized constituents. That analysis will surely be
affected by the client’s stated legal purpose, and the exercise undertaken in
Section IV will be valuable.
These reforms may also disincentive some founders from opting into the
benefit corporation form. Even without the suggested rules, an interpretation of
lawyerly obligations that has lawyers serving the public interest over individual
constituents and reporting failure to create a public benefit could be unappealing
for founders who are accustomed to having both freedom to run a business and
access to trusted counsel. What manager would want to work in an environment
where the attorney is more watchdog than counselor? After all, companies can
seek third-party certifications or take other steps to signal to the market and
investors that they are pursuing a mission alongside to profit.
In important ways, these arguments miss the purpose of the benefit
corporation form. Benefit corporations were not created to replace traditional
corporations; they were created to provide an option for founders and investors
that is somewhere between the traditional charity and for-profit models.386 From
that vantage point, benefit corporations are less corporations with additional
requirements than organizations that can pursue a mission without the
limitations of nonprofit and tax-exempt entities. Founders and investors
concerned with mission are actively seeking out ways to combine for-profit
flexibility with the mission-driven work of charity.387 The duties and suggested
reforms described herein should appeal to rather than repel those individuals;
they commit to the benefit corporation’s purpose and help create a predictable
monitoring and enforcement environment. Serious social entrepreneurs who
want to use the benefit corporation to create a public benefit will look to lawyers
to structure businesses and transactions in a way that furthers their mission.
Embedding those obligations in lawyers’ ethical duties helps attorneys create
value for those clients.
Finally, should these requirements result in pro forma compliance with the
authorizing legislation, the citizen lawyer’s task is to exercise her rights as a
citizen to speak out against this kind of behavior and advocate for changes to the
legislation. When representing a client whose purpose is to further the public, it
may be that no constituent is willing or able to comply with this mandate. The
lawyer need not whistleblow on her client if she does not deem it in the client’s
best interest, but she is not precluded from working to better the legal regime
governing her client organization.388
386. See discussion supra Section III.A.
387. See Plerhoples, supra note 7, 525–26, 542.
388. For example,
The implications of this idea are particularly important for the so-called Washington
lawyer (wherever he might be) who is hired to represent his client before agencies and
legislatures contemplating new law. This may put us on one of the borderlines I do not
pretend to resolve definitively, yet I think we can get an idea of how to think about these
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VI. CONCLUSION
If benefit corporations are successful, questions will arise about the nature of
corporate law itself and of the role of the legal profession. Attorneys’ ethical
duties flow in part from the law governing organizational clients. In the case of
corporate representation, obligations reflect the dominant understanding of
corporate law. Many interpretations of ethical rules in the corporate context
reflect a private law conceptualization of corporate law. Benefit corporation
statutes, however, attempt to create a corporate form that embraces corporate
law as a public ordering mechanism. Ethical obligations will have to be
reinterpreted to reflect this change. To the extent that ethical rules lack clarity,
or where ethics rules do not work to further the purpose of benefit corporation
statutes, there is an opportunity for states to reform ethics codes for lawyers
representing benefit corporations.
The ethics of representing corporations developed around an acceptance of
corporate law as a private ordering mechanism that embraces shareholder
primacy. On the one hand, the benefit corporation could be seen as an exception
to the rule that corporate law plays a purely private function in society. Benefit
corporations will be those who opt out of this rule and into a public ordering
scheme. A generation of attorneys advising these clients will embrace as an
essential part of their professional obligations dispensing with the sort of advice
currently reserved to discretion.389 On the other hand, the public purpose
enshrined in benefit corporation legislation may open the door to viewing
corporate law generally as a public ordering tool and corporate attorneys,
therefore, as stewards of the public interest.
Representing the benefit corporation requires a different kind of lawyering
than does representing a traditional corporation. The legal profession will need
to take steps to embrace the citizen lawyer model for attorneys representing
benefit corporations. These proposed reforms aid in that movement, but
educating lawyers, law students, and clients about these new corporate forms
and lawyers’ responsibilities thereunder will also be necessary for these
attorneys to comply with their ethical and legal obligations.390
cases too. To the extent that such representation involves participation in a formal
proceeding in which laws or regulations are drafted and technical competence is required,
the task is closer to the traditional task of the lawyer as I have sketched it, and the legal
friend concept is more appropriate. To the extent that the representation involves (wholly
lawful) deployment of political pressures, inducements, and considerations, it is closer
to being political action, and thus to requiring the kind of overriding concern for the
common good that should motivate all political actors. Certainly it is absurd that a man
should seek to be insulated from moral judgment of his accomplishments as a political
string-puller or publicist by the defense that he was only doing it for money.
Fried, supra note 64, at 1087 n.39.
389. And may indeed be forced to.
390. The Shift Project, for example, trains businesses on implementing the Guiding Principles
into their operations. Shift is the Leading Center of Expertise on the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights., SHIFT, https://www.shiftproject.org/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).

